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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses authenticity and integrity of medical images using watermarking. 
Hospital Information Systems (HIS), Radiology Information Systems (RIS) and Picture 
Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) now form the information 
infrastructure for today’s healthcare as these provide new ways to store, access and 
distribute medical data that also involve some security risk. Watermarking can be seen 
as an additional tool for security measures. 
 
As the medical tradition is very strict with the quality of biomedical images, the 
watermarking method must be reversible or if not, region of Interest (ROI) needs to be 
defined and left intact. Watermarking should also serve as an integrity control and 
should be able to authenticate the medical image. 
 
Three watermarking techniques were proposed.  First, Strict Authentication 
Watermarking (SAW) embeds the digital signature of the image in the ROI and the 
image can be reverted back to its original value bit by bit if required.  Second, Strict 
Authentication Watermarking with JPEG Compression (SAW-JPEG) uses the same 
principal as SAW, but is able to survive some degree of JPEG compression.  Third, 
Authentication Watermarking with Tamper Detection and Recovery (AW-TDR) is able 
to localise tampering, whilst simultaneously reconstructing the original image. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Security of Medical Images 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to Information Security 
One of the major concerns throughout the world today is to make high quality 
healthcare available to all. Traditionally, part of the difficulty in achieving equitable 
access to healthcare has been that the provider and the recipient must be physically 
present in the same place. Recent advances in information and communication 
technologies have increased the number of ways in which healthcare can be delivered to 
reduce these difficulties. 
 
Telemedicine, the area where medicine and information and communications 
technology (ICT) meet, is probably the part of this revolution that could have the 
greatest impact on healthcare delivery. The prefix ‘tele’ derives from the Greek ‘at a 
distance’, and therefore, more simply telemedicine is medicine at a distance. The 
information infrastructure of modern healthcare is based on digital information 
management. While the recent advances in information and communication 
technologies provide new means to access, handle and move medical information, they 
also compromise their security due to their ease of manipulation and replication. All 
patients records, electronic or not, linked to medical secrecy, must be confidential. The 
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digital handling of the EPR (Electronic Patient Record) on a network requires a 
systematic content validation that is aimed at quality control: actuality (precise interest 
of the information at a given instant) and reliability (authentication of the origin and 
integrity). 
 
Attacks on security are best characterised by viewing the function of the computer 
system as a provision of information. In general, normal communication is represented 
as a flow of information from source to destination. 
 
There are four categories of attacks: 
• Interruption: An attack on availability. Information is destroyed or becomes 
unavailable or unusable. 
• Interception: An attack on confidentiality. An unauthorised party gains access to 
information. 
• Modification: An attack on integrity. An unauthorised party not only gains 
access to, but also tampers with information. 
• Fabrication: An attack on authenticity. An unauthorised party inserts counterfeit 
objects into the system. 
 
These attacks can be divided further into two categories, according to the nature of the 
attacks: 
• Active Attacks: These attacks involve modification of the data stream or the 
creation of a false stream and can be subdivided into four categories: 
1. Masquerade: One entity pretends to be a different entity. 
2. Replay: The passive capture of a data unit and its subsequent retransmission 
to produce an unauthorised effect. 
3. Modification of messages: Some portion of a legitimate message is altered, 
or messages are delayed or recorded to produce an unauthorised effect. 
4. Denial of service: One prevents or inhibits the normal use or management of 
communications facilities. 
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Figure 1.1 Security attacks 
 
• Passive Attacks: These attacks involve eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, 
transmission and can be subdivided into two categories: 
1. Release of message contents: An unauthorised party obtains information that 
is being transmitted. 
2. Traffic analysis: An unauthorised party obtains information useful in 
guessing the nature of communication by observing the pattern of masked 
message transmissions. 
 
This research will deal with modification and fabrication attacks on medical images. We 
will look at how to authenticate medical images using watermarking. 
1.2 Image Authentication and Motivation 
Image authentication can assure receivers that the received image is from the authorized 
source and that the image content is identical to the one sent. It is becoming easier and 
easier to tamper with digital image in ways that are difficult to detect. For example, 
Figure 1.2 shows two nearly identical images using readily available software (e.g. 
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Adobe Photoshop). The cyst was removed from the image by using the healing brush 
tool. It is difficult if not impossible to tell which picture is the original and which has 
been tampered with. If this image were a critical piece of evidence in a legal case or 
police investigation, this form of tampering might pose a serious problem. 
 
The problem of authenticating messages has been studied in cryptography (Stinson 
1995). Specifically, we are interested in methods for answering the following questions: 
 
i. Has the image been altered in any way what so ever? 
ii. What parts of the image have been altered? 
iii. Can an altered image be restored? 
 
To implement such methods for medical images, the following questions are relevant: 
 
iv. Do medical images have the same properties as other 
images? 
v. What are the requirements needed to make watermarking 
suitable for medical images? 
 
Many non-watermarking methods exist for answering these questions. Two common 
cryptographic approaches are the creation of a hash function and digital signature. The 
classical scenario for image authentication can be described as follows (Stallings 2003): 
A sender S wants to transmit a digital image I to a receiver R. When the image Ir is 
eventually delivered to R, by means of a network facility or any other media capable of 
storing digital data, an effective authentication scheme must ensure with high 
probability that: 
 
• The Image Ir received by R is exactly the same as I the sender S has sent. 
(Integrity verification) 
• The receiver R can verify the alleged source of the image Ir, where R can 
determine if S has actually sent Ir, or if a pirate has forged it. (Alleged Source 
Verification) 
Chapter 1. Security of Digital Images  5 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
 
(a) An ultrasound image of a cystic breast tissue 
 
(b) An ultrasound image of a normal breast tissue 
Figure 1.2 Ease of modifying images 
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• R can demonstrate that Ir was actually sent by S, and S cannot deny having sent 
Ir. (non-repudiation Property). 
 
Image authentication techniques are usually based on two kinds of tools: digital 
signature and watermarking. A digital signature is non-repudiation, encrypted version of 
the message digest extracted from the data. It is usually stored as a separate file, which 
can be attached to the data to prove integrity and originality. Watermarking techniques 
consider the image as a communication channel. The embedded watermark, usually 
imperceptible, may contain either a specific producer ID or some content-related codes 
that are used for authentication. 
 
Digital watermarking (Cox et al. 2002, Langelaar et al. 2000) offers a promising 
alternative to digital signatures in image authentication applications. The use of 
watermarks instead of digital signatures typically records additional functionality by 
exploiting inherent properties of image content. The main advantage of digital 
watermarking is that the authentication information is directly embedded into the image 
data. As a result, the authentication information survives even when the host image 
undergoes format conversions. In contrast, a digital signature appended in the header of 
an image file may be easily stripped off, for instance, when the file is opened and saved 
in a different format. The digital watermark's capability for isolating manipulated image 
regions is another advantage. This functionality is known as the tamper localisation 
property. It is worth mentioning that both digital signatures and authentication 
watermarks are useful only for establishing the source of the image and detecting 
manipulations occurring after the signature/watermark has been inserted. Neither 
technique by itself is capable of certifying that a signal represents an original unaltered 
scene, unless supported by additional mechanisms (Friedman 1993). In this respect, 
digital watermarking differs from forensic image analysis (Federation Bureau of 
Investigation 2000). 
 
Most watermarking techniques modify, and hence distort, the host signal in order to 
insert authentication information. In many applications, loss of image fidelity is not 
prohibitive as long as the original and modified images are perceptually equivalent. On 
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the other hand, in medical, military and legal imaging applications, where the need for 
authentication is often paramount, there are typically stringent constraints on data 
fidelity that prohibit any permanent signal distortion in the watermarking process. For 
instance, artifacts in a patient's diagnostic image may cause errors in diagnosis and 
treatment with possible life-threatening consequences. Likewise, in military 
applications, satellite and aerial photographs are often enlarged, enhanced or further 
processed by computer vision algorithms. Unless the loss of fidelity is either carefully 
limited or eliminated altogether, the corresponding artifacts may be amplified by the 
post-processing operations. In these applications, the permanent loss of signal fidelity 
due to digital watermarking can be remedied by lossless data embedding (also referred 
as reversible, invertible or distortion-free data embedding) techniques. These 
techniques, like their lossy counterparts, insert information bits by modifying the host 
signal, thus induce an embedding distortion. Nevertheless, they also enable the removal 
of such distortions and the exact/lossless restoration of the original host signal after 
extraction of the embedded information. Lossless data embedding methods can be 
employed for digital image authentication. Lossless (reversible) authentication 
watermarks provide a complete framework; the authentication property of the 
watermark protects the integrity of the image, whereas the quality is preserved by the 
reversibility of the watermarking process. 
 
1.3 Current Security Methods for Medical Images 
• Data Encryption 
Encryption is the most useful approach to assure data security during its transmission 
through public communication networks. Image data scrambled by a sender cannot be 
understood by anyone other than an intended party and assures data security during 
transmission, but not before or after. 
 
o Virtual Private Network (VPN) is the most common application of data 
encryption techniques to ensure data security during its transmission 
through public communication networks. 
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o DICOM Security or DICOM standard part 15 has been released to 
provide a standardised method (selection of security standards, 
encryption algorithms and parameters) for secure medical image 
communication but has yet to be implemented by the industrial and 
medical community. 
 
• Data Embedding 
Data embedding can be a form of steganography that conceals patient information and 
the digital signature in the image so that the visual quality of the image is not 
perceptually affected. It provides a permanent assurance of image data security no 
matter when and how the image has been manipulated. But there is no standard 
embedding method and it is also difficult to implement for a variety of medical image 
modalities. Watermarking researchers in the medical field have also incorporated 
hashing to produce image digests and use them as watermarks (Cao et al. 2003, Guo and 
Zhuang 2003, Zhou et al. 2001). 
1.4 Watermarking and Steganography 
Watermarking, that is the technique of placing and transmitting a small amount of data 
imperceptibly in the host or cover data has many applications including broadcast 
monitoring, owner identification, proof of ownership, and content authentication. Paper 
watermarks are used regularly as an authentication (anti-counterfeiting) measure in 
valuable documents, such as bank notes, cheques and visa stamps. For instance, the 
authenticity of a bank note is confirmed by the existence of a visible watermark pattern 
when the note is held to the light. Paper watermarks are designed to be i) easily 
detectable, ii) hard to reproduce, and iii) invisible or unobtrusive in normal use of the 
document. Digital watermarks inherit many of the paper watermarks features and 
properties: they are digital patterns superimposed on digital signals; the patterns should 
be easily detectable, yet be very hard to reproduce without specific knowledge 
(cryptographic keys); the watermark should be invisible or unobtrusive during normal 
use of the digital signal. 
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However, steganography or data hiding has a long history and the use of paper 
watermarks for copy protection can be traced back to the thirteenth century (Murray 
1996). The earliest forms of information hiding can actually be considered to be highly 
crude forms of private-key cryptography; the “key” in this case being the knowledge of 
the method being employed (security through obscurity). Steganography books are 
filled with examples of such methods used throughout history. Greek messengers had 
messages tattooed into their shaved head, concealing the message when their hair finally 
grew back. Wax tables were scraped down to bare wood where a message was 
scratched. Once the tables were re-waxed, the hidden message was secure (Petitcolas 
2000). Over time these primitive cryptographic techniques improved, increasing speed, 
capacity and security of the transmitted message. 
Today, crypto-graphical techniques have reached a level of sophistication such that 
properly encrypted communications can be assumed secure well beyond the useful life 
of the information transmitted. In fact, it is projected that the most powerful algorithms 
using multi kilobit key lengths could not be comprised through brute force, even if all 
the computing power worldwide for the next 20 years was focused on the attack. Of 
course the possibility exists that vulnerabilities could be found, or computing power 
breakthroughs could occur, but for most users in most applications, current 
cryptographic techniques are generally sufficient. 
Why then pursue the field of information hiding? Several good reasons exist, the first 
being that “security through obscurity” is not necessarily a bad thing, provided that it is 
not the only security mechanism employed. Steganography for instance allows us to 
hide encrypted messages in mediums less likely to attract attention. A garble of random 
characters being transmitted between two users may tip off a watchful third party that 
sensitive information is being transmitted; whereas baby pictures with some additional 
noise present may not. The underlying information in the pictures is still encrypted, but 
attracts far less attention by being distributed in the picture than it would otherwise. 
Nowadays, there exist watermarking methods for virtually every kind of digital media: 
text documents (Su et al. 1998, Brassil et al. 1999), images (Tsai et al. 2004, Zhang et 
al. 2003, Paquet et al. 2003), video (Sun and Chang 2003, Okada et al. 2002), audio (Li 
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and Xue 2003, Yan et al. 2004), even for 3D polygonal models (Kwon et al. 2003, 
Benedens and Busch 2000), maps (Barni et al. 2001) and computer programs (Monden 
et al. 2000). Interestingly, watermarking technology is not limited to digital media, but 
is also applicable to chemical data like protein structures, for example (Eggers et al. 
2001). 
1.5 Research Objectives 
There are three research objectives: 
1. To investigate methods for authentication watermarking. 
2. To develop techniques for authentication appropriate for a chosen 
medical image modality. 
3. To investigate and evaluate any such technique on the chosen medical 
image modality. 
1.6 Research Strategy and Method 
The sources of information for the present work came from three different subject areas. 
Firstly, information security in general; secondly, hiding information, known as 
steganography; and thirdly medical imaging. 
 
The research concentrates on authenticity and integrity of medical images, and 
investigates current techniques of authentication with an emphasis on those most 
suitable for medical images. A few issues need to be clarified before choosing tools and 
techniques for this research. The first issue to consider is whether complete 
authentication or content authentication is required as an entity. 
 
Complete authentication refers to techniques that consider the image and do not allow 
any manipulations or transformation (Wu and Liu 1998, Yeung and Mintzer 1997). 
Many existing message authentication techniques can be applied directly. For example, 
a digital signature might be placed in the LSB of the uncompressed data or the header of 
the compressed data. Manipulations will be detected if the hash value of the altered 
message does not match the digital signature. In practice, fragile watermarks or 
traditional digital signatures may be used for complete authentication. 
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Content authentication refers to a different objective that is applicable to multimedia 
data. The meaning of multimedia data is based on its content instead rather than specific 
bit content. In some applications, manipulations on the bit streams without changing the 
meaning of content are considered as acceptable. Compression is an example. Digital 
Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM) standard has included JPEG (lossy 
and lossless), JPEG-LS and RLE (known as TIFF) compressions in their standard. 
JPEG2000 has also been considered in the report (National Electrical Manufacturers 
Association (NEMA) 2002). 
 
The second issue is whether the watermarks are reversible or permanent. Ideally the 
medical image should be unaltered through the process of watermarking (Macq and 
Dewey 1999, Giakoumaki et al. 2003, Yang and Bao 2003) and the watermarking 
should be reversible so that the original image can be restored. However, it may be 
argued that if the change is imperceptible and has no impact on diagnosis then it is 
acceptable and may be compared with compression, which is accepted. 
 
The third issue is if we decide to have watermarks for content authentication, whether 
compression should be distinguished from other manipulations. Previous watermarks 
are either too fragile for compression or too flexible to detect malicious manipulations. 
The performance of an authenticator should be simultaneously evaluated by two 
parameters: the probability of false alarm and the probability of missing manipulations. 
Fragile watermarks, which have a low probability of missing manipulations, usually fail 
to survive compression so that their probability of false alarm is very high. Previous 
researchers have attempted to modify the fragile watermark to make it robust to 
compression (Wolfgang and Delp 1996, Zhu et al. 1996). However, such modifications 
then failed to distinguish both compression and tampering. In general, watermarks made 
robust to most manipulations are usually then too robust to detect malicious 
manipulations. 
 
Watermarking capacity is determined by invisibility and robustness requirements. The 
relationship between capacity, invisibility and robustness is shown in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3 Watermarking properties 
 
It is seen that if one parameter is fixed, then the other two parameters are inversely 
proportional. For instance, a specific application may determine how many message bits 
are needed, copyright protection may need to embed about 10 bytes and authentication 
may need from 100-1000 bits for a 265 X 256 image. After the amount to embed is 
decided, there exists a trade-off between visual quality and robustness. Robustness 
refers to the extraction of embedded bits with a probability of error equal to or 
approaching zero. Visual quality represents the quality of watermarked image. In 
general, if we want to make our message bits more robust against attack, then a longer 
codeword will be necessary to provide better error resistance. However, degradation in 
visual quality can be expected. 
1.7 Dissertation Outline 
This thesis is divided into 7 chapters and organised as follows: 
Chapter 1:  This chapter introduces the problem area and outlines approaches to be 
explored. In this chapter watermarking is introduced as the technique 
used in the research. 
Chapter 2: This chapter presents the area of message authentication. The digital 
signature is discussed as a possible watermark. A review of current 
image authentication is presented and various embedding techniques are 
discussed. 
Chapter 3: This chapter presents medical image watermarking. Issues and properties 
of medical image watermarking are discussed. Some approaches in 
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watermarking medical images and the issues of tamper localisation and 
restoration are presented. 
Chapter 4: This chapter proposes two strict authentication watermarking techniques 
SAW and SAW-JPEG. SAW embeds the digital signature of the medical 
image in the region of non-interest. SAW-JPEG is an enhanced SAW 
and is made to be robust to some degree of JPEG compression. 
Chapter 5: This chapter proposes another authentication watermarking with tamper 
detection and recovery AW-TDR. 
Chapter 6: This chapter discusses the results obtained from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
and evaluates the proposed techniques. 
Chapter 7: This chapter presents a summary of the thesis and conclusions to the 
work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the area of image authentication, the techniques available and 
introduces the area of image watermarking. The chapter is structured as follows: 
 
• Section 2.2 introduces hash functions and how it is used to secure message 
transmission and describes the method. The use of private key and public key is 
also discussed. 
• Section 2.3 describes a digital signature algorithm and the purpose of having one 
person who can produce a signature that can checked by everybody else by 
using private and public key. This section also describes how a digital signature 
algorithm is used for image authentication. 
• Section 2.4 presents an image authentication scheme using content-based, 
feature-based, edge-based, mean-based and relation-based methods. 
• Section 2.5 gives definition of fragile and semi-fragile watermarking and 
provides a review of methods available. 
• Section 2.6 lists the requirements for watermarking-based authentication system. 
• Section 2.7 describes the main components for a watermarking system. 
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• Section 2.8 will show some of the most frequent attacks that an image 
authentication system has to overcome 
• Section 2.9 presents embedding techniques for watermarking. 
 
2.2 Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
A hash function such as MD5 (Rivest April 1992) and SHA-1 (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology 1995) produces a one-way message digest, a fingerprint of a 
file, message, or other block of data. The hash based message authentication code 
(HMAC) encrypts the hash value of the message with a secret key shared by the sender 
and receiver. This technique assumes that two communicating parties, A and B share 
the same secret key KAB. When A has a message M to send to B, it calculates the 
message authentication code as a function of the message and the key: MACM = H (KAB, 
M). 
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Figure 2.1 HMAC (Adapted from Network Security Essentials page 58) 
 
The message and the MAC code are transmitted to the intended recipient. The recipient 
performs the same calculation on the received message, using the same secret key, to 
generate a new message authentication code. The received code is compared to the 
calculated code. If we assume that only the receiver and the sender know the identity of 
the secret key, and if the received code matches the calculated code, then 
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1. The receiver is assured that the message has not been altered. If an 
attacker alters the message, the received code will not match the 
calculated code. 
2. The receiver is assured that the message is from the alleged sender as no 
one else could prepare a message with a proper code. 
 
Modern cryptography can use either private-key or the public-key key method 
(Garfinkel and Spafford 1996). Private-key cryptography (symmetric cryptography) 
uses the same key for data encryption and decryption. It requires both the sender and the 
receiver to agree on a key before they can exchange message securely. Although 
computation speed for obtaining the private-key is acceptable, the management of the 
keys is difficult. 
 
Public-key cryptography (asymmetric cryptography) uses two different keys (a key pair) 
for encryption and decryption. The keys in the key pair are mathematically related, but 
it is computationally infeasible to deduce one key from the other. In public-key 
cryptography, the public key can be made public. Anyone can encrypt a message using 
a public key, but only the corresponding private-key owner can decrypt it. Public-key 
methods are much more convenient to use because they do not share the key 
management problem as in private-key methods. However they require a longer time for 
encryption and decryption. Digital signature is a major application of public-key 
cryptography (Rivest et al. 1978). 
 
2.3 Digital Signature Algorithms 
The basic idea of a digital signature is that a signature on a message can be created by 
only one person, but checked by anyone. It can thus perform the sort of function in the 
electronic world that ordinary signatures do in the world of paper. The asymmetric 
encryption algorithms published in the late 1970s, such as RSA, in conjunction with the 
secure hash functions, are digital signature algorithms, which allow the sender to 
associate its unforgeable imprint with the digital image, so that the receiver can check 
its integrity and its source. Non-repudiation is also guaranteed. 
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The asymmetric encryption involves the use of two separate keys: a public key made 
public for others to decrypt a received message, and a private key known only to its 
owner to encrypt the original. When A has a message M to send to B, it calculates the 
digital signature sig M as a function of the hashed message H(M) and the private key 
Kprivate: sigM = F(Kprivate, H(M)). The message plus digital signature are transmitted 
to the intended receiver. The receiver performs the same hash calculation on the 
received message to generate a hashed message. The receiver also decrypts the received 
signature sigM, using public key Kpublic, to get the received hashed message. The 
received hashed message is compared to the hashed message. If we assume that only the 
sender knows the identity of the secret key, and if the received hashed message is 
identical to the new hashed message, then 
 
• The receiver is assured that the message has not been altered. If an attacker 
alters the message but does not alter the code, then the receiver’s calculation of 
the hashed message will differ from the new hashed message.                    
Because the attacker is assumed not to know the private key, the attacker cannot 
alter the code to correspond to the alterations in the message. 
• The receiver is assured that the message is from the alleged sender. Because no 
one knows the private key, no one else could prepare a message with a proper 
digital signature. 
 
Image authentication is projected as a procedure of guaranteeing that the image content 
has not been altered, or at least that the visual (or semantic) characteristics of the image 
are maintained after incidental manipulations such as JPEG compression. In other 
words, one of the objectives of image authentication is to verify the integrity of the 
image. For many applications such as medical archiving, news reporting and political 
events, the capability of detecting manipulations of digital images is often required. 
 
To address both the integrity and legitimacy issues, a wide variety of techniques have 
been proposed for image authentication. Depending on the ways chosen to convey the 
authentication data, these techniques can be divided into two categories: labelling-based 
techniques (e.g., the method proposed by Friedman 1993) and watermarking-based 
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techniques (e.g., method proposed by Walton 1995). The main difference between these 
two categories of techniques is that labelling-based techniques create the authentication 
data in a separate file while watermarking-based authentication can be accomplished 
without the overhead of a separate file. 
 
Original Data
Hash
Function Compare
Original Data
Original Hash Digital Signature Original Hash
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encryption
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Figure 2.2.  Basic model of a digital signature 
 
The digital signature-based image authentication is based on the concept of a digital 
signature, which is derived from a cryptographic technique called public key 
cryptosystem (Rivest et al. 1978, Diffie and Hellman 1976). Figure 2.2 shows the basic 
model of a digital signature. The sender first uses a hash function, such as MD5 (Rivest 
1992), to hash the content of the original data to a small file called digest. MD5 was the 
most widely used secure hash algorithm until the last few years that the security of a 
128-bit hash code has become questionable (Dobbertin 1996) and in summer 2004 was 
broken by Chinese researchers (Wang et al. 2004, Hawkes et al. 2005). Then the digest 
is encrypted with the sender’s private key. The encrypted digest can form a unique 
‘signature’ because only the sender has the knowledge of the private key. The signature 
is then sent to the receiver along with the original information. The receiver can use the 
sender’s public key to decrypt the signature, and obtain the original digest. The received 
information can also be hashed by using the same hash function at the sender’s side. If 
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the decrypted digest matches the newly created digest, the legitimacy and the integrity 
of the message are therefore authenticated. 
 
There are two points worth noting in the process of a digital signature. First, the 
plaintext is not limited to text file. In fact, any types of digital data, such as digitised 
audio data and digital image. Therefore the original data in Figure 2.2 can be replaced 
with a digital image, and the process of a digital signature can then be used to verify the 
legitimacy and integrity of the image. The concept of the trustworthy digital camera 
(Friedman 1993) for image authentication is based on this idea. Friedman (1993) 
associated the idea of a digital signature with the digital camera and proposed a 
‘trustworthy digital camera’. The proposed digital camera uses a digital sensor instead 
of film and delivers the image directly in a computer-compatible format. A secure 
microprocessor is assumed to be built in the digital camera and is programmed with the 
private key at the factory for the encryption of the digital signature. The public key 
needed for later authentication appears on the camera as well as the image’s border. 
Once the digital camera captures the image, it produces two output files. One is an all-
digital industry-standard file format representing the captured image and the other is an 
encrypted digital signature generated by applying the camera’s unique private key to a 
hash of the captured image file. The digital image file and the digital signature can later 
be distributed freely and safely. 
 
Image authentication is accomplished by calculating the hash of the received image, and 
by using the public key to decode the digital signature to reveal the original hash; the 
two hash values are compared. If these two hash values match, the image is considered 
to be authentic. If these two hash values are different, the integrity of this image is 
questionable. It should be noted that the hash algorithms such as SHA-256 are sensitive 
to single bit changes. This is strict authentication. However in the process of lossy 
compression, although the image is essentially retained, individual pixel values may be 
changed. Strict authentication will determine the image is no longer authentic and does 
not provide a useful check. A different check is required. 
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2.4 Other Image Authentication Schemes 
• Content-based authentication 
Image manipulation such as lossy compression, changes individual pixel values and so 
strict authentication (hash value calculated from all bit values in the image) will fail. In 
these cases a method must be sought to determine features in the image that will be 
invariant through the compression-decompression process. Edge information, DCT 
coefficients, colour, and intensity histograms are regarded as potential invariant 
features. 
 
In Schneider and Chang’s (Schneider and Chang 1996) method, the intensity histogram 
is employed as the invariant feature in the implementation of the content-based image 
authentication scheme. To be effective, the image is divided into blocks of variable 
sizes and the intensity histogram of each block is computed separately and is used as the 
authentication code. To tolerate incidental modifications, the Euclidean distance 
between intensity histograms was used as a measure of the content of the image. They 
pointed out that using a reduced distance function could increase the maximum 
permissible compression ratio up to 14:1 if the block average intensity is used for 
detecting image content manipulation. 
 
• Feature-based method 
Bhattacharjee and Kutter (1998) proposed another algorithm to extract a smaller size 
feature of an image. Their feature extraction algorithm is based on the so-called scale 
interaction model. Instead of using Gabor wavelets, they adopted Mexican-Hat wavelets 
as the filter for detecting the feature points. The algorithm for detecting feature points is 
depicted as follows. 
 
• Define the feature-detection function, Pij(.) as: 
 
)(.)()( xMxMx jiij
rrr γ−=Ρ      (2.1) 
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where )(xM i
r
 and )(xM j
r
represent the responses of Mexican-Hat wavelets at 
the image location xr  for scales I and j respectively. For the image A, the 
wavelet response )(xM i
r
 is given by: 
 
〉⋅〈= −− AxxM ii ));2(2()( 1
rr ψ      (2.2) 
 
where 〉〈.;. denotes the convolution of its operands. The normalising constant γ is 
given by γ=2-(i-j) , the operator ⋅ returns the absolute value of its parameter, and 
the )(xrψ represents the response of the Mexican-Hat mother wavelet, and is 
defined as: 
)
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• Determine points of local maximum of  Pij(.). These points correspond to the set 
of potential feature points 
• Accept a point of local maximum in Pij(.) as a feature-point if the variance of the 
image pixels in the neighbourhood of the point is higher than a threshold. This 
criterion eliminates a suspicious local maximum in featureless regions of the 
image. 
 
The column positions and row positions of the resulting feature points are concatenated 
to form a string of digits, and then encrypted to generate the image signature. In order to 
determine whether an image A is authentic with another known image B, the feature set 
SA of A is computed. The feature set SA is then compared with the feature set SB of B 
that is decrypted from the signature of B. The following rules are adopted to 
authenticate the image A. 
• Verify that each feature location is present both in SB and in SA. 
• Verify that no feature location is present in SA but absent in SB. 
• Two feature points with coordinates xr  and yr  are said to match if: 
2<− yx rr  
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• Edge-based method 
The edges in an image are the boundaries or contours where significant changes occur 
in some physical aspects of an image. Edges are a strong content feature for an image. 
However, coding edge values and positions can carry a large overhead. One way to 
resolve this problem is to use a binary map to represent only the edges. For example, Li 
et al (2003) used a binary map to encode the edges of an image in their image 
authentication scheme. However it is known that edges will be modified when high 
compression ratios are used. Consequently, the success of using edges as the 
authentication code is greatly dependent on the capacity of the authentication system to 
discriminate the differences the edges produced by content-preserving manipulations 
from those content-changing manipulations. 
 
• Mean-based method 
The local mean is a simple and practical image feature to represent the content of an 
image. Lou and Liu (2000) proposed such an algorithm to generate a mean-based 
feature code. The original image is divided into non-overlapping blocks and the mean of 
each block calculated and quantized according to a predefined parameter. The 
calculated results are then encoded to form the authentication code. In the verification 
process the quantized means of each block of the received image is calculated. The 
quantized code is compared with the original quantized code on a block-by-block basis. 
A binary error map is produced as an output with ‘1’ denoting match and ‘0’ denoting 
mismatch. The verifier can thus tell the possibly tampered blocks by inspecting the error 
map. There is also some capability to restore the untampered version, which may be 
attractive in some real time image application such as video. 
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Figure 2.3 Mean based feature code 
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• Relation-based method 
Unlike the methods introduced before, relation-based methods divide the original image 
into non-overlapping blocks, and use the relation between blocks as the feature code. 
The method proposed by Lin and Chang (Lin and Chang 2001) is called SARI. The 
feature code in SARI is generated to survive the JPEG compression. To serve this 
purpose, the process of the feature code generation starts with dividing the original 
image into 8x8 non-overlapping blocks. Each block is then DCT transformed. The 
transformed DCT blocks are further grouped into two non-overlapping sets. There are 
equal numbers of DCT blocks in each set. A secret key-dependant mapping function 
then maps one-to-one each DCT block in one set into another DCT block in another set, 
and generates N/2 DCT block pairs. For each block pair, a number of DCT coefficients 
are then selected and compared. Comparing the corresponding coefficients of the paired 
blocks then generates the feature code. 
 
The feature code of the received image is extracted using the same secret key and is 
compared with the original feature code. If neither block in each block pair has been 
maliciously manipulated, the relation between the selected coefficients is maintained. 
Otherwise, the relation between the selected coefficients may be changed. 
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Figure 2.4 Feature code generated with SARI authentication scheme 
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2.5 Fragile and Semi-fragile Watermarking 
A fragile watermarking is one that is likely to be destroyed and become undetectable 
after the image has been modified in any way. Watermarking researchers have 
considered fragility as undesirable and therefore seek to design robust watermarks that 
can survive many forms of distortion. However, fragility can be an advantage for 
authentication purposes. If a fragile watermark is detected correctly in an image, we can 
say that the image has not been altered or tampered with since the watermark has been 
embedded. A fragile watermark is a mark that is readily altered or destroyed when the 
host image is modified through linear or nonlinear transformation (Yeung and Mintzer 
1998). In the case of authenticity, a fragile watermark has to prove that the image has 
been modified and is no longer authentic. However, for copy protection applications, 
the watermark has to be robust and be able to withstand different types of alterations 
such as lossy compression and filtering. 
 
Fragile watermarks are not suited for enforcing copyright ownership of digital images. 
An attacker would attempt to destroy the embedded watermark and fragile watermarks 
are by definition easily destroyed. The sensitivity of fragile watermarks to modification 
leads to their use in image authentication. That is, it may be of interest for parties to 
verify that an image has not been edited, damaged, or altered since it was marked. 
Image authentication systems have applicability in law, commerce, defense, and 
journalism. Since digital images are easy to modify, a secure authentication system is 
useful in showing that no tampering has occurred during situations where the credibility 
of an image may be questioned. Common examples are the marking of images in a 
database to detect tampering (Mintzer et al. 1998), for example in the use of a 
“trustworthy camera” so news agencies can ensure an image is not fabricated or edited 
to falsify events (Friedman 1993), and the marking of images in commerce so a buyer 
can be assured that the images bought are authentic upon receipt (Wong 1998). Other 
situations include images used in courtroom evidence, journalistic photography, or 
images involved in intelligence. 
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As mentioned previously, one of the methods used to verify the authenticity of a digital 
work is the use of a signature system (Stallings 2003). In a signature system, a digest of 
the data to be authenticated is obtained by the use of cryptographic hash functions 
(Stallings 2003, Wolfgang and Delp 1999). The digest is then cryptographically signed 
to produce the signature that is bound to the original data. Later, a recipient verifies the 
signature by examining the digest of the (possibly modified) data and using a 
verification algorithm to determine if the data is authentic. 
 
While the purpose of fragile watermarking and digital signature systems are similar, 
watermarking systems offer several advantages compared to signature systems (Memon 
et al. 1999) at the expense of requiring some modification (watermark insertion) of the 
image data. As a watermark is embedded directly in the image data, no additional 
information is necessary for authenticity verification. This is unlike digital signatures 
since the signature itself must be bound to the transmitted data. Therefore the critical 
information needed in the authenticity testing process is discreetly hidden and more 
difficult to remove than a digital signature. Also, digital signature systems view an 
image as an arbitrary bit stream and do not exploit its unique structure. Therefore a 
signature system may be able to detect that an image has been modified but cannot 
characterise the alterations. Many watermarking systems can determine which areas of a 
marked image have been altered and which areas have not, as well as estimate the 
nature of the alterations. 
 
2.5.1. Examples of Fragile Marking Systems 
 
Early fragile watermarking systems embedded the mark directly in the spatial domain of 
an image, such as techniques described in Walton (1995) and van Schyndel et al. 
(1994). These techniques embed the mark in the least significant bit plane for perceptual 
transparency. Their significant disadvantages include the ease of bypassing the security 
they provide (Yeung and Mintzer 1998, Fridrich 1998) and the inability to lossy 
compress the image without damaging the mark. 
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Any processing of the image, such as compression will result in changes to the LSB. If 
a watermark is to be embedded in the LSB plane of the image, we imply that the image 
has not undergone any such process. Fragile watermarking algorithms are concerned 
with complete integrity verification. The slightest modification of the host image will 
alter or destroy the fragile watermark. Yeung and Mintzer (1998) embeds a binary logo 
of the same size as the host image by means of a key dependent look-up table (LUT) 
that maps every possible pixel luminance value to either 0 or 1. The watermark is 
inserted by adjusting the least significant bit (LSB) value of each image pixel in the 
spatial domain to match its corresponding LUT value. At the receiving side, the LUT 
can be reconstructed due to the knowledge of the secret key. The integrity verification 
can be performed either by simple visual inspection of the extracted watermark, or by 
automated comparison with the original one. This watermarking scheme is very 
sensitive to any distortion in the image and is very vulnerable to a block analysis attack. 
 
Fridrich and Baldoza (2000) improved the algorithm by using 64x64 block cipher 
instead of LUT, and the watermark is embedded in a 32x32 block. The improved 
scheme can be used against the block analysis attack. 
 
A further fragile marking technique described by Wong (1999), obtains a digest using a 
hash function. The image, its dimensions and marking key are hashed during 
embedding and used to modify the least-significant bit plane of the original image. This 
is done in such a way that when the correct detection side information and unaltered 
marked image are provided to the detector, a bi-level image chosen by the owner (such 
as a company logo or insignia) is observed. This technique has localisation properties 
and can identify regions of modified pixels within a marked image. However, Holliman 
and Memon (2000) soon presented a vector quantization (VQ) counterfeiting attack that 
can construct a counterfeit image from a VQ codebook generated from a set of 
watermarked images. To solve the problem of VQ counterfeiting attack, several 
enhanced algorithms were proposed (Holliman and Memon 2000, Fridrich et al. 2000, 
Wong and Memon 2000). Nonetheless, they either fail to effectively address the 
problem or sacrifice the tamper localisation accuracy of the original methods (Celik et 
al. 2002). Celik et al. (2002) then presented an algorithm based on Wong’s scheme and 
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demonstrated that their algorithm can thwart the VQ codebook attack while sustaining 
the localisation property. 
 
The technique of Yeung and Mintzer (1998), whose security is examined in (Memon et 
al. 1999), is also one where the correct detection information results in a bi-level image. 
However, the embedding technique is more extensive than inserting a binary value into 
the least-significant bit plane. The marking key is used to generate several pseudo-
random look-up tables (one for each channel or colour component) that control how 
subsequent modification of the pixel data will occur. Then, after the insertion process is 
completed, a modified error diffusion process can be used to spread the effects of 
altering the pixels, making the mark more difficult to see. As discussed in (Memon et al. 
1999), the security of the technique depends on the difficulty of inferring the look-up 
tables. The search space for the table entries can be drastically reduced if knowledge of 
the bi-level watermark image is known. A modification (position-dependent lookup 
tables) is proposed in (Memon et al. 1999) to dramatically increase the search space. 
 
Various transformations, such as the discrete cosine transform (DCT) and wavelet 
transforms, are widely used for lossy image compression and much is known about how 
the transform coefficients may be altered (quantized) to minimize perceptual distortion 
(Wolfgang et al. 1999). There is also a great deal of interest in transform embedding for 
robust image marking systems to make embedded marks more resilient to attacks. 
 
There are advantages for fragile watermarking systems to use the transform domain. 
Many fragile watermarking systems are adapted from lossy compression systems (such 
as JPEG), which have the benefit that the watermark can be embedded within the 
compressed representation. The properties of a transform can be used to characterise 
how an image has been damaged or altered. Also, applications may require a watermark 
to possess robustness to certain types of modification (such as brightness changes) yet 
be able to detect other modifications (e.g. local pixel replacement). Wu and Liu (1998) 
describe a technique based on a modified JPEG encoder. The watermark is inserted by 
changing the quantized DCT coefficients before entropy coding. A special lookup table 
of binary values (whose design is constrained to ensure mark invisibility) is used to 
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partition the space of all possible DCT coefficient values into two sets. The two sets are 
then used to modify the image coefficients to encode a bi-level image (such as a logo.) 
To reduce the blocking effects of altering coefficients, it is suggested that the DC 
coefficient and any coefficients with low energy be unmarked. 
 
2.5.2. Examples of Semi-fragile watermarking 
 
A semi-fragile watermark describes a watermark that is unaffected by legitimate 
distortions, but destroyed by illegitimate distortions. It provides the mechanism for 
implementing selective authentication. Semi-fragile watermark combines the properties 
of fragile and robust watermarks. Like a robust watermark, a semi-fragile watermark is 
capable of tolerating some degree of change to the watermarked image, such as the 
addition of quantization noise from lossy compression. And like a fragile watermark, 
the semi-fragile watermark is capable of localising regions of the image that have been 
tampered with and distinguish them from regions that are still authentic. Thus, a semi-
fragile watermark can differentiate between localised tampering and information 
preserving, lossy transformations. Many fragile watermarking systems perform 
watermark embedding in the LSB plane and are unable to tolerate a single bit error in 
this bit. However, the quantization noise introduced by compression is likely to cause 
many least significant bits to change. Furthermore, recent fragile watermarking systems 
employ cryptographic hash functions that are not suitable in a semi-fragile framework. 
A hash function h(x) will produce completely different outputs h(x1) and h(x2) if the 
binary inputs are distinct but very similar. Even if some characteristic of the image that 
is expected to remain invariant during lossy compression were hashed, the output of the 
hash function would have to be embedded in a way that is resilient to errors. 
 
Wolfgang and Delp (1996) extended van Schyndel’s work to improve robustness and 
localisation in their VW2D technique. Adding a bipolar M-sequence in the spatial 
domain embeds the watermark. Detection is via a modified correlation detector. For 
localisation, a blocking structure is used during embedding and detection. This mark has 
been compared to other approaches using hash functions (Wolfgang, Delp 1999). 
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Fridrich (1998) proposes a similar technique. To prevent unauthorised removal or 
intentional watermark distortion, the author recommends making the mark dependent on 
the image in which it is embedded. The binary mark used corresponds to a pseudo-
random signal generated from a secret key, the block number and the content of the 
block represented with an M-tuplet of bits. Each block is then watermarked using 
O’Ruanaidh (1997) spread spectrum technique. The author claims that the watermark is 
fairly robust with respect to brightness and contrast adjustment, noise adding, histogram 
manipulation, cropping and moderate JPEG compression up to 55% quality. 
 
Kundur and Hatzinakos (1998) and Xie and Arce (1998) describe techniques based on 
the wavelet transform. Kundur embeds a mark by modifying the quantization process of 
Haar wavelet transform coefficients while Xie selectively inserts watermark bits by 
processing the image after it is in a compressed form using the SPIHT algorithm (Said 
1996). A wavelet decomposition of an image contains both frequency and spatial 
information about the image. Hence, watermarks embedded in the wavelet domain have 
the advantage of being able to locate and characterise tampering of a marked image. 
 
2.5.3. Summary of Different Methods 
 
We summarise the different methods presented in this chapter in Table 2.1. The class to 
which each method belongs is indicated as fragile, semi-fragile, and digital signature, as 
well as the type of authentication data used and whether the method offers a possible 
localisation and reconstruction of the areas tampered with. From the table, we notice 
that, generally, the fragile watermarking methods allow only a strict integrity service, 
while the semi-fragile watermarking methods and methods based on external signature 
guarantee a content authentication. It is also interesting to note that few methods are 
currently able to restore, even partially, the tampered regions of the image. 
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Method Class Mark Dependent Integrity Localization Recovery 
Yeung and 
Mintzer 
(1997) 
fragile Predefined 
logo 
no strict yes No 
Walton (1995) fragile checksums yes strict yes No 
Fridrich and 
Goljan (1999) 
fragile image 
comp. 
yes strict yes Yes 
Wong (1999) fragile Hash 
function 
yes strict yes No 
Lin and Chang 
(2000) 
semifragile DCT 
coeff. 
yes content yes Yes 
Wolfgang and 
Delp (1996) 
semifragile m-
sequences 
no content yes No 
Fridrich 
(1998) 
semifragile Block-
based 
yes content yes No 
Kundur and 
Hatzinakos 
(1998) 
semifragile Random 
noise 
no strict yes No 
Queluz (2002) signature edges yes content yes No 
Bhattacharjee 
and Kutter 
(1998) 
signature Interest 
points 
yes content yes No 
Lin and Chang 
(1998) 
signature DCT 
coeff. 
yes content yes No 
Wolfgang and 
Delp (1996) 
signature Hash 
function 
yes strict yes No 
Table 2.1 Summary of methods ensuring an authentication service 
 
2.6 Requirements of Watermarking-based Authentication System 
 
A watermarking-based authentication system can be considered as effective if it 
satisfies the following requirements as outlined by (Tong and Zheng-ding 2002) and 
(Lin and Chang 2000): 
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• Invisibility: The embedded watermark is invisible. It is the basic requirement of 
maintaining the quality of marked images. The marked image must be 
perceptually identical to the original under normal observation. It is a question 
of making sure that the visual impact of watermarking is as weak as possible so 
that the watermarked image remains identical to the original. 
• Detect tampering: An authentication watermarking system should detect any 
tampering in a marked image. This is the most fundamental property to reliably 
test authenticity of the image. The system must be sensitive to malicious 
manipulations such as altering the image in specific areas. 
• Security: The embedded watermark cannot be forged or manipulated. In such 
systems, the marking key is private and should be difficult to deduce. Insertion 
of a mark by unauthorised parties should be difficult. 
• Identification of a manipulated area or localisation: The authentication 
watermark should be able to detect the location of altered areas and verify other 
areas as authentic. The detector should also be able to estimate what kind of 
modification has occurred. 
• Reconstruction of altered regions: The system should have the ability to restore, 
even partially, altered or destroyed regions in order to allow the user to know the 
original content of the manipulated areas. 
• Protocols: Protocols are an important aspect of any image authentication. It is 
obvious that any algorithm alone cannot guarantee the security of the system. It 
is necessary to define a set of scenarios and specifications describing the 
operation and rules of the system, such as management of the keys, physical 
security and the communication protocols between parties and so forth. 
 
We further classify the requirements into mandatory requirements and desirable 
requirements as seen in Table 2.2. 
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Classification               Requirements 
Mandatory • Invisibility 
• Tamper detection 
• Security 
Desirable • Localize tamper 
• Reconstruction 
Other • Protocols 
 
Table 2.2 Authentication watermarking requirements 
 
2.7 Main Components of a Watermarking System 
A watermarking system can be divided into three main components: 
 
1. The generating function, fg, of the watermark signal, W, to be added to the host 
signal. Typically, the watermark signal depends on a key, k, and watermark information, 
i. Examples of watermark information are company logo and user information. 
 
),( kifW g=      (2.4) 
 
Possibly, it may also depend on the host data, Y, into which it is embedded 
 
W = fg(i,k,Y)     (2.5) 
 
2. The embedding function, fm, which incorporates the watermark signal, W, into 
the host data, Y, yielding the watermarked data Yw. Typically, the watermark signal 
depends on a key, K 
 
Yw = fm (Y,W,K)    (2.6) 
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3. The extracting function, fy, which recovers the watermark information, W, from 
the received watermarked data, Ŷw, using the key corresponding to embedding and the 
help of the original host data, Y 
Ŵ = fy (Y,Ŷw,K)    (2.7) 
 
Or without the original host data, Y 
 
Ŵ= fy(Ŷw,K)     (2.8) 
 
The first two components, watermarking generating and watermarking embedding, are 
often regarded as one, especially for methods in which the embedded watermark is 
independent of the host signal. We separate them out for a better analysis of the 
watermarking algorithms, since some of the watermark is host signal content dependent, 
with the watermark generating from the host signal and being embedded back to the 
host signal. 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the generic watermarking scheme. The inputs to the embedding 
process are the watermark, the host data, and an optional key. The watermark can take 
many forms, such as number, text, binary sequence, or image. The key is used to 
enforce security and to protect the watermark. The output of the watermarking scheme 
is the watermarked data. The channel for the watermarked image could be lossy and 
susceptible to malicious attack. The inputs for extraction are the received watermarked 
data, the key corresponding to the embedding key, and, depending on the method, the 
original data and/or watermarking information. The output of the watermark recovery 
process is the recovered watermark. The watermark is inspected to determine if the 
original image altered and recover information such as copyright status. 
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Figure 2.4. Generic Watermarking Scheme 
 
2.8 Malicious Attacks 
This section will show some of the most frequent attacks that an image authentication 
system has to overcome. The common objective of these attacks is to trick the 
authentication system, in other words, to show that an image remains authentic even 
though its content has been modified (or sometimes, the opposite). 
 
One of the most common attacks against fragile watermarking systems consists of 
trying to modify the protected image without altering the embedded watermark, or even 
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more common, trying to create a new watermark that the authenticator will consider 
authentic. Take the following simplified example where the integrity of an image is 
insured by a fragile watermark, independent of the image content and embedded in the 
LSB of its pixels. We easily see that if we alter the image without modifying the LSB, 
the watermark will remain as it was, and the authentication process will not detect any 
falsification. In general, when the integrity of an image is based on a mark that is 
independent of its content, it is possible to develop an attack that could copy a valid 
watermark from one image into another image. By doing so, the second image becomes 
protected even though the second image is false. This attack can also be performed over 
the same image. First, extract the watermark from the image, then manipulate the 
image, and finally reinsert the watermark on the altered image. This process will cheat 
the authentication system. One way to resist this kind of attack is to use a content-based 
watermarking algorithm or choose a transform domain authentication scheme, which 
has higher security than a spatial technique. 
 
Another classic attack tries to discover the secret key used to generate the watermark. 
This kind of attack, also called Brute Force Attack, is well known by the security 
community. Once the key has been found, it is very easy for an attacker to falsify a 
watermark of an image that has been protected by this key. The only way to counter this 
attack is to use long keys to put off the attacker from trying to discover the key, because 
of the high cost of computing time. 
2.9  Embedding Techniques 
2.9.1 Least Significant Bit Modification 
The most straightforward method of watermark embedding would be to embed the 
watermark into the least significant bits of the cover object (Johnson and Katzenbeisser 
2000). Given the extraordinarily high channel capacity of using the entire cover for 
transmission in this method, a smaller object may be embedded multiple times. Even if 
most of these were lost due to attacks, a single surviving watermark would be 
considered a success. 
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LSB substitution however, despite its simplicity has many drawbacks. Although it may 
survive transformations such as cropping, any addition of noise or lossy compression is 
likely to defeat the watermark. An even better attack would be to simply set the LSB 
bits of each pixel to one fully defeating the watermark with negligible impact on the 
cover object. Furthermore, once the algorithm is discovered, an intermediate party could 
easily modify the embedded watermark. 
LSB modification proves to be a simple and fairly powerful tool, however lacks the 
basic robustness that watermarking applications require. 
 
2.9.2 Correlation-Based Techniques 
Another technique for watermark embedding is to exploit the correlation properties of 
additive pseudo-random noise patterns as applied to an image (Langelaar et al. 2000). A 
pseudo-random noise (PN) pattern W(x, y) is added to the cover image    I(x, y), 
according to the equation shown below in equation 2.9. 
    (2.9) 
In equation 2.9, k denotes a gain factor, and IW the resulting watermarked image. 
Increasing k increases the robustness of the watermark at the expense of the quality of 
the watermarked image. Rather than determining the values of the watermark from 
“blocks” in the spatial domain, we can employ CDMA spread-spectrum techniques to 
scatter each of the bits randomly throughout the cover image, increasing capacity and 
improving resistance to cropping (Langelaar et al. 2000). To detect the watermark, each 
seed is used to generate its PN sequence, which is then correlated with the entire image. 
If the correlation is high, then that bit in the watermark is set to “1”, otherwise a “0”. 
The process is then repeated for all the values of the watermark. CDMA improves on 
the robustness of the watermark significantly, but requires several orders more of 
calculation. 
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2.9.3 Frequency Domain Techniques 
The classic and still most popular domain for image processing is that of the Discrete-
Cosine-Transform, or DCT. The DCT allows an image to be broken up into different 
frequency bands, making it much easier to embed watermarking information into the 
middle frequency bands of an image. The middle frequency bands are chosen so that 
they minimise effects on the most visually important parts of the image (low 
frequencies) without being removed through compression and noise attacks (high 
frequencies). 
One such technique utilizes the comparison of middle-band DCT coefficients to encode 
a single bit into a DCT block. To begin, we define the middle-band frequencies (FM) of 
an 8x8 DCT block as shown below in figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2.5.  Definition of DCT Regions 
FL is used to denote the lowest frequency components of the block, while FH is used to 
denote the higher frequency components. FM is chosen as the embedding region as to 
provide additional resistance to lossy compression techniques, while avoiding 
significant modification of the cover image (Hernandez et al. 2000). 
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2.9.4 Wavelet watermarking 
The wavelet transform provides another possible domain for watermark embedding. 
The DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform) separates an image into a lower resolution 
approximation image (LL) as well as horizontal (HL), vertical (LH) and diagonal (HH) 
detail components. The process can then be repeated to compute multiple “scale” 
wavelet decomposition, as in the 2-scale wavelet transform shown below in figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6.  2 Scale 2-Dimensional Discrete Wavelet Transform 
 
One of the many advantages over the wavelet transform is that it is believed to model 
more accurately aspects of the human visual system (HVS) as compared to the FFT or 
DCT. This allows us to use higher energy watermarks in regions that the HVS is known 
to be less sensitive to the eye, such as the high resolution detail bands {LH, HL, HH). 
Embedding watermarks in these regions allow the robustness of the watermark to be 
increased (Langelaar et al. 2000). 
One of the most straightforward techniques is to use a similar embedding technique to 
that used in the DCT, the embedding of a CDMA sequence in the detail bands 
according to the equation shown below in equation 2.10, 
     (2.10) 
where Wi denotes the coefficient of the transformed image, xi the bit of the watermark to 
be embedded, and  a scaling factor. To detect the watermark we generate the same 
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pseudo-random sequence used in CDMA generation and determine its correlation with 
the two transformed detail bands. If the correlation exceeds some threshold T, the 
watermark is detected. 
This can be easily extended to multiple bit messages by embedding multiple 
watermarks into the image. As in the spatial version, a separate seed is used for each PN 
sequence, which is then added to the detail coefficients as in equation 2.5. During 
detection, if the correlation exceeds T for a particular sequence a “1” is recovered; 
otherwise a zero. The recovery process then iterates through the entire PN sequence 
until all the bits of the watermark have been recovered. 
Chapter 3. Medical Image Watermarking  40 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Medical Image Watermarking 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the properties of medical image watermarking and discusses 
techniques available for tamper localisation and image reconstruction. This chapter is 
structured as follows: 
 
• Section 3.2 highlights the properties of medical image watermarking and 
outlines the objectives for watermarking in medical domain. 
• Section 3.3 introduces reversible watermarking and describes such a scheme. 
• Section 3.4 introduces the concept of the region of interest (ROI) in medical 
images. 
• Section 3.5 discusses authentication watermarking with localisation capabilities 
and the security risk of such techniques. 
• Section 3.6 presents a few techniques available for using watermark as an aid in 
the reconstruction of image that have been corrupted. 
• Section 3.7 gives a review of previous work done on medical images. 
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• Section 3.8 introduces Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine 
(DICOM) standard and Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS). 
• Section 3.9 discusses methods for evaluating perceptual impacts of watermarks. 
 
3.2 Properties of Medical Image Watermarking 
Security of medical information, derived from strict ethics and legislative rules, gives 
rights to the patient and duties to the health professionals. This imposes three mandatory 
characteristics: confidentiality, reliability and availability: 
 
• Confidentiality means that only the entitled persons have access to the 
information and that information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorised individuals, entities or processes 
• Reliability which has two aspects; Integrity: the information has not been 
modified or destroyed by non-authorized person, and authentication: proof that 
the information belongs indeed to the correct patient and is issued from the 
correct source 
• Availability is the ability of an information system to be used by the entitled 
persons in the normal conditions of access and exercise. 
 
Security risks of medical images can vary from random errors occurring during 
transmission to lost or overwritten segments in the network during exchanges in the 
intra- and inter-hospital networks. One must also guarantee that the header of the image 
file always matches that of the image data. In addition to these unintentional 
modifications one can envision various malicious manipulations to replace or modify 
parts of the image, called tampering. The usual constraints of watermarking are 
invisibility of the mark, capacity, secrecy to unauthorised persons, and robustness to 
attempts to suppress the mark. These demands also exist in the medical domain but 
additional constraints are added. Three main objectives are foreseen in the medical 
domain (Coatrieux et al. 2000, Mintzer et al. 1997): 
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1. Imperceptible / Reversible Watermarking 
Medical tradition is very strict with the quality of biomedical images. Thus the 
watermarking method must be reversible, in that the original pixel values must be 
exactly recovered (Macq and Dewey 1999). This limits significantly the capacity and 
the number of possible methods. 
 
An alternative way is to define regions of interest, to be left intact, and leave us with 
regions of insertion where a watermark could be inserted and does not interfere or 
disturb the radiologist. 
 
2. Integrity Control 
The “secure camera” concept applies also to biomedical images, especially in the 
context of legal aspects and insurance claims. There is thus a need to prove that the 
images on which the diagnoses and any insurance claims are based have preserved their 
integrity. 
 
3. Authentication 
A critical requirement in patient records is to authenticate the different parts of the 
electronic patient record, in particular the images. More often an attached file or a 
header, which carries all the needed information, identifies an image. However, keeping 
the meta-data of the image in a separate header file is prone to forgeries or clumsy 
practices. An alternative would be to embed all such information into the image data 
itself. 
 
3.3 Reversible Watermarking 
Reversible watermarking means that the original data will be available after a 
watermark is embedded. In summary any reversible watermarking system comprises the 
following steps: 
i. Embedding a digital watermark, w in an original image x 
resulting in y = f (x , w) 
Chapter 3. Medical Image Watermarking  43 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
ii. Transmitting the watermarked image y from the encoder to the 
decoder through an error-free transmission channel 
iii. Extracting the watermark image w and restoring the original 
image x = f -1 (y , w) 
 
The concept for reversible data embedding first appeared in an authentication method 
for images in a patent from the Eastman Kodak Company (Honsinger et al. 2001). 
There are several techniques for reversible data embedding and the scheme proposed by 
Goljan et al (2001) will be described. 
 
Let us assume that the original image is a greyscale image with M x N pixels and with 
pixel value from the set P. For example, for an 8-bit greyscale image, P= {0, …, 255}. 
They start with dividing the image into disjoint groups of n adjacent pixels (x1, …, xn). 
For example we can choose groups of n = 4 consecutive pixels in a row. They also 
define so called discrimination function f that assigns a real number 
ℜ∈= )(),...,( 1 Gfxxf n to each pixel group G = (x1, …, xn). The purpose of the 
discrimination function is to capture the smoothness or regularity of the group of pixels 
G. Discrimination function used was: 
 
∑
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Then an invertible operation F on P called ‘flipping’ is defined. Flipping is a 
permutation of grey levels that consists of 2-cycles. Thus, F will have the property that 
F2 = Identity or F(F(x)) = x for all x ∈P. For example, the permutation FLSB defined as 0 
↔ 1, 2 ↔ 3, …, 254↔255 correspond to flipping the LSB of each grey level. The 
permutation 0↔2, 1↔3, 4↔6, 5↔7, … corresponds to an invertible noise with larger 
amplitude. Discrimination function f and the flipping operation F were used to define 
three types of pixel groups: R, S and U. 
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Regular groups: G ∈  R if f(F(G)) > f(G) 
Singular groups: G ∈ S if f(F(G)) < f(G) 
Unusable groups: G ∈ U if f(F(G)) = f(G) 
 
3.4 Region of Interest (ROI) 
Typically, a medical image is diagnosed before being archived in long-term storage, so 
the significant part of the image is already determined. The significant part is called 
ROI (Region Of Interest), which must be preserved without any lack of information. In 
Chapter 4, we propose a strict authentication watermarking considering ROI. In general, 
the ROI is stored as it is or compressed by a lossless algorithm and the other part is 
compressed by a lossy algorithm, which can achieve a higher compression rate than 
lossless compression algorithm (Wakatani 2002). 
 
Distant learning is one of applications using a database of medical images, which may 
refer to the image of a newly discovered medical case, and there may be images with 
the ROI part for long-term storage. Therefore, it is desirable that the copyright and 
integrity of the medical image with ROI part are protected. However it is impossible to 
embed signature information into the ROI part since the ROI must be kept without any 
distortion. 
3.5 Localisation and Security Risk 
Many authentication methods based on watermarking have the ability to identify 
regions of the image that have been tampered with, while verifying that the remainder 
of the image has not been changed. This capability is referred to as localisation. 
Localisation is useful because knowledge of where an image has been tampered with 
can be used to infer: 1) the motive for tampering; 2) a possible attacker; and 3) whether 
the alteration is legitimate. For example, consider an ultrasound image of a kidney. If 
our authenticator simply states that the image has been modified, the tampered image is 
useless. However, if the authenticator also indicated that the modification only occurred 
within the region of non -interest, the image is still very useful for learning purposes. 
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Most localised authentication methods rely on some form of block-wise authentication, 
in which the image is divided into a number of spatial regions, each of which is 
authenticated separately. If part of the image is modified, only the affected regions fail 
to authenticate. 
 
There are a number of security risks associated with localised authentication systems. 
Although the risks discussed here can be countered with simple modifications, it is 
important to be aware of them. We are concerned with forgery attacks in which an 
attacker wishes to embed a valid watermark into either a modified or false image. Two 
basic attacks will be examined. In search attacks, the attacker is assumed to have a 
detector that can determine whether the image is authentic or not. In collage attacks, the 
attacker is assumed to have two or more images embedded with the same watermark. 
 
3.5.1 Search Attacks 
 
Let us consider the situation in which everyone, including potential attackers, has access 
to a watermark detector. This situation might arise, for example, if images are being 
distributed to the public over the Internet, and an authentication system is to be used to 
guarantee that each image is delivered without corruption or tampering. In theory, the 
attacker can use the detector to defeat any authentication system, regardless of whether 
it is localised or not. To do so requires a brute-force search. To embed a forged 
watermark into an image, the attacker can enter slightly modified versions of the image 
into the detector until one is found that the detector reports as authentic. 
 
In practice, this search would usually be prohibitive. However, with a block-wise 
authentication system, the search space can be considerably smaller. The attacker can 
perform a separate, independent search on each block. If the block size is small enough, 
the search becomes feasible. Such attacks can be countered by choosing a sufficiently 
large block size. 
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3.5.2 Collage Attacks  
 
The second category of attacks relies on having access to one or more authentic 
watermarked images. By examining these images, an attacker can come up with sets of 
blocks that are authentic and construct a forged image from them like a ‘collage’. 
Holliman and Memon (2000) describe an attack applicable to block-wise watermarks, in 
which a cryptographic signature is embedded in each block and the signature depends 
only on the content of the block itself. Consider what happens in such a system when 
two blocks of a watermarked image are interchanged, thereby changing the image as a 
whole. Because each block contains a self-authenticating watermark, and because each 
block remains unaltered, the image is deemed authentic. Thus, even if all blocks are 
scrambled into a random order, the system will regard the entire image as authentic. 
 
By exploiting this weakness of block-wise independent system, it is possible to create a 
completely new image that is assembled from the set of independent, authentic blocks. 
Suppose an attacker has a number of images available, all watermarked using the same 
key, this can be viewed as a large database of authentic blocks from which a new image 
can be built. To forge a watermark in an unwatermarked image, the attacker divides the 
image into blocks and replaces each block with the most similar block from the 
database. With a large enough database of watermarked images, the results may be quite 
effective. 
 
The solution to counter these types of attacks is to use a different key for watermarking 
every image. However, such an approach is not always feasible, in that a given image 
can only be authenticated if the correct key is available. The keys would need to be 
either known to the users or stored as associated data. 
 
A more practical approach suggested in Holliman and Memon (2000) is to make the 
blocks overlap so that the signature of each block depends on surrounding data, as well 
as the data within the block itself. This introduces ambiguity to the localisation, because 
a change in one block will change the signature that must be embedded in its 
neighbours. This complicates the attacker’s attempt to build an image out of 
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watermarked blocks, as each block must match up properly with the neighbouring 
blocks. 
 
3.6 Restoration 
From the previous section we have seen that it is possible to verify if an image has been 
altered and determine where it has been altered. This section considers the manner in 
which an altered or tampered image might be restored. 
 
There are two restoration strategies: exact restoration and approximate restoration. In 
exact restoration the image is restored to its original state, where the goal is to create a 
perfect copy. This is a well-studied problem in communication and will be discussed in 
the next section. Approximate restoration is a more recent concept that seeks to restore 
an image to approximately the original state while accepting that there will be 
differences between the restored and original image. However, the restored image may 
still be valuable if these differences are not significant. 
 
3.6.1 Embedded Redundancy 
 
It is well known that error detection and error correction codes allow changes in data to 
be detected, and in the latter to be corrected. Error correction codes (ECC) are widely 
used in communication and data storage to maintain the integrity of digital data. ECC 
codes are like digital signatures, are appended to the data. However, there are important 
differences between ECC codes and signatures: 
 
1. Digital signatures are used to verify that the data has not been altered. 
2. Digital signatures need fewer bits than ECC to detect a change has occurred than 
are needed to perform correction (Shannon 1948). 
3. ECC codes usually assume a maximum number of bit changes. If this number is 
exceeded, it is possible for errors to go undetected 
 
The size of an ECC code is usually very much larger than a digital signature. In fact, an 
ECC code can represent a significant fraction of transmitted bits. The size of the ECC 
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code determines both the maximum number of bit changes that can be detected and the 
maximum number of bits that can be corrected. 
 
An image can be considered as a collection of bits, and a variety of different error 
correction codes can be applied (e.g., Hamming codes, turbo codes, and trellis codes). 
This metadata can be represented as watermark. For example, a Reed Solomon ECC 
code can be used to generate parity bytes for each row and column of an image (Lee and 
Won 1999, Lee and Chen 2002). These parity bytes can be embedded as a watermark in 
the two significant bit planes of the image. It is reported that for a 229 X 229 image, up 
to 13 bytes in a single row or column can be corrected. Even if the errors cannot be 
corrected, they can be localised, because parity bytes are calculated for each row and 
column. 
 
This method is modified when it is expected that errors will come as bursts (Lee and 
Won 2000). This is the case when a localised region of an image has been modified or 
cropped. To increase the resistance to burst errors, the locations of the pixels in the 
image are randomised prior to calculation of the ECC codes. This randomisation is a 
function of a watermark key. 
 
If we want to restore an image to its original state, a very significant cost must be 
incurred to store the ECC codes. If this cost is too high, or the resources are simply 
unavailable, then approximate restoration techniques may be a good compromise. 
 
3.6.2 Self-embedding 
 
A further approach is self-embedding (Lin and Chang 2000, Fridrich and Goljan 1999), 
which is a highly compressed version of the image in the image itself. Thus, if portions 
of the watermarked image are removed or destroyed, these modified regions can be 
replaced with their corresponding low-resolution versions. 
 
In the algorithm of Fridrich and Goljan (1999), a highly compressed JPEG (50% quality 
factor) version of the image is produced. This low-resolution image requires only one 
bit per pixel and can thus be inserted in the LSB plane of the image. However, each 
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compressed DCT block is not simply inserted into the LSB of its corresponding spatial 
block; rather the binary sequence is first encrypted and then inserted in the LSB plane of 
a block that is some distance away and in a randomly chosen direction. The authors 
suggest a minimum distance of 3/10 the image size. The random mapping is generated 
using a key that must be known to both the embedder and the detector. Storing the low-
resolution version of a block some distance away from the corresponding block allows 
this block to be restored even if it has been completely deleted. A higher quality 
reconstruction is possible if more bits are allocated to the storage of the low-resolution 
image. The method is severely affected by any modifications to the encoding bit plane. 
 
3.6.3 Blind Restoration 
 
An alternative approach to approximate correction of errors is based on blind 
restoration. Blind restoration attempts to first determine what distortions an image has 
undergone, and then to invert these distortions to restore the image to its original state 
(Kundur and Hatzinakos 1996). Such a process is only appropriate if the distortion is 
invertible. Thus, blind restoration is not useful against, for example, clipping. 
 
The method assumes that the image and the watermark undergo the same distortion. If 
the watermark is made capable of determining the distortion that has occurred, then an 
inverse process (assuming such a process exists), can be applied to restore the 
watermark and the image. A combination of blind restoration and self-embedding may 
also be appropriate. In principle, blind restoration might allow a lower resolution image 
to be embedded. This is because at least some of the distortion may be invertible. In 
addition, where clipping or other non-invertible distortions have been applied, the self-
embedded information allows for a low-resolution restoration. 
 
3.7 Previous Work on Medical Image Watermarking 
Digital watermarking can imperceptibly embed messages without changing image size 
or format. When applied to medical images, the watermarked image can still conform to 
the DICOM format (Guo and Zhuang 2003). Some researchers already apply 
watermarking technique to medical data. Zhou et al (2001) present a watermarking 
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method for verifying the authenticity and integrity of a digital mammography image. 
They used a digital envelope as a watermark and the least significant bits (LSB) of one 
random pixel of the mammogram are replaced by one bit of the digital envelope (DE) 
bit stream. Instead of the whole image data, only partial image data (i.e., the most 
significant bits (MSB) of each pixel is used for verifying integrity). Cao et al (2003) 
extend their work on digital envelopes and embed their DE by making a random walk 
sequence and replacing the LSB of each selected pixel. 
 
Other researchers adapt digital watermarking for interleaving patient information with 
medical images to reduce storage and transmission overheads (Acharya et al 2001). 
Again, the LSB of image pixels are replaced for embedding. Chao et al (2002) propose 
a discrete cosine transform (DCT) based data-hiding technique that is capable of hiding 
those EPR related data into a marked image. The information is embedded in the 
quantized DCT coefficients. The drawback of the above watermarking approaches is 
that the original medical image is distorted in a non-invertible manner. Therefore it is 
impossible for a watermark decoder to recover the original image. 
 
A reversible watermarking scheme involves inserting a watermark into the original 
image in an invertible manner, so that when the watermark was later extracted, the 
original image can be recovered completely. Research has also been done in the area of 
reversible watermarking in medical images. Trichili et al (2002) proposes an image 
virtual border as the watermarking area. Patient data is then embedded in the LSBs of 
the border. Guo and Zhuang (2003) present a scheme where the digital signature of the 
whole image and patient information is embedded. They define three types of pixel 
groups as suggested by Goljan et al (2001), R, S, and U. The problem with this 
technique is that the capacity for embedding is highly dependent on the number of R 
and S group of pixels. The maximum number of bits available for embedding in Guo 
and Zhuang’s (2003) scheme for ultrasound images of 640x480x8 bits is 1668 bits. This 
will give an embedding rate of 0.0054 bits/pixel. 
 
Cho et al (2001) studied watermark methods appropriate for medical images and 
conclude that the spatial watermark method such as LSB had the advantage that it did 
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not damage the important information if the watermark was embedded outside the 
region of interest. 
 
3.8 DICOM and PACS 
The initial goal in developing a standard for the transmission of digital images was to 
enable users to retrieve images and associated information from digital imaging 
equipment in a standard format that would be the same across multiple manufacturers. 
The first result was the American College of Radiology (ACR)-National Electrical 
Manufacturers' Association (NEMA) standard, which specified a point-to-point 
connection. The rapid evolution of computer networking and of picture archiving and 
communication systems meant that this point-to-point standard would be of limited use. 
Consequently, a major effort was undertaken to redesign the ACR-NEMA standard by 
taking into account existing standards for networks and current concepts in the handling 
of information on such networks. The Digital Imaging and Communications in 
Medicine (DICOM) standard was the result of this effort. Its popularity has made 
discussion, if not implementation, of the standard common whenever digital imaging 
systems are specified or purchased.  
The use of DICOM has now extended beyond only an image and has been adapted to 
manage data from many medical specialties (e.g., pathology, ECG). It is also a global 
standard being adopted by the European standards organization, the Comitee Europeân 
de Normalisation (CEN), as MEDICOM standard. In Japan, the Japanese Industry 
Association of Radiation Apparatus and the Medical Information Systems Development 
Centre have adopted portions of DICOM that pertain to the exchange of images on 
removable media and are considering DICOM for future versions of the Medical Image 
Processing Standard. The DICOM standard is now being maintained and extended by 
an international, multi-specialty committee (Horii 1997). 
The DICOM standard has become the predominant standard for the communication of 
medical images. The DICOM standard consists of multiple documents (National 
Electrical Manufacturers Association 2003), which at the time of writing consist of 16 
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published parts. Each DICOM document is identified by a title and standard number, 
which takes the form "PS 3.X-YYYY," where "X" is commonly called the part number 
and "YYYY" is the year of publication. For example, DICOM Part 2 has a title of 
"Conformance" and document number PS 3.2-2003. In informal usage, the year is often 
dropped. Watermarking is not currently considered in any part of this standard. 
Picture archiving and communication system (PACS) is a work flow-integrated system 
for managing medical image and related data. It is designed to streamline operations 
throughout the whole patient care delivery process (Huang 2003). PACS was originally 
developed for radiology services over 20 years ago to capture digital medical images 
rather than in film-based media. Figure 3.3 describes the enterprise level web-based 
image/data EPR server with archive. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Enterprise Level Web-based Image/Data EPR server with archive 
 
3.9 Evaluating Perceptual Impact of Watermarks 
There is few, if any, watermarking systems producing watermarks that are perfectly 
imperceptible. However, the perceptibility of a given system’s watermark may be high 
or low compared against other watermarks or other types of processing, such as 
compression. In this section we address the question of how to measure that 
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perceptibility, so that such comparison can be made. This section begins with a 
discussion of two types of perceptibility that exist as causes for concern. 
 
3.9.1 Fidelity and Quality 
 
In the evaluation of a watermarking system, there are two different types of 
perceptibility that can be judged: fidelity and quality. Fidelity is a measure of the 
similarity between images before or after watermarking (Cox et al. 2002). A high 
fidelity reproduction is a reproduction that is very similar to the original. A low fidelity 
reproduction is dissimilar or distinguishable from the original. Quality on the other hand 
is an absolute measure of appeal. A high quality image simply looks good. It has no 
obvious processing artefacts. Both types of perceptibility are significant in evaluating 
watermarking systems. 
 
To explore the difference between fidelity and quality, consider an example of video 
from a surveillance camera. The video is typically greyscale, low resolution, 
compressed and generally considered to be of low quality. Consider a watermarked 
version of this video that looks identical to the original. This watermarked video must 
also have low quality, but as it is indistinguishable from the original, it has high fidelity. 
 
For some watermarking applications, fidelity is the primary perceptual measure of 
concern. In these cases, the watermarked image must be indistinguishable from the 
original. For example, a patient may require this of a watermark applied to his medical 
images. 
 
3.9.2 Human Evaluation Measurement Techniques 
 
Although the claim of imperceptibility is often made in the watermarking literature, 
rigorous perceptual quality and fidelity studies involving human observers are rare. 
Some claims of imperceptibility are based on automated evaluations, discussed in 
section 3.9.3. However, many claims are based on a single observer’s judgements on a 
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small number of trials. These empirical data points are not sufficient for proper 
perceptual evaluation or comparison of watermarking algorithms. 
 
An experimental paradigm for measuring perceptual phenomena is the two alternatives 
forced choice (2AFC) (Green and Swets 1974). In this procedure, observers are asked to 
give one of two alternative responses to each of several trial stimuli. For example, to 
test the quality impact of a watermarking algorithm, each trial of the experiment might 
present the observer with two versions of one image. One version of the image would 
be the original, the other would be watermarked. The observer, unaware of the 
differences between the images, must decide which one is higher in quality. In the case 
where no difference in quality can be perceived, the responses are expected to be 
random. Random choices suggest that observers are unable to identify one selection as 
being consistently better quality than the other. Thus, 50% correct answers correspond 
to zero JND, while 75% correct corresponds to one JND (Cox et al. 2002). 
 
The 2AFC technique can also be used to measure fidelity. Consider an experiment in 
which the observer is presented with three images (Figure 3.4). One is labelled as the 
original. Of the other two, one is an exact copy of the original and the other is the 
watermarked version. The subject must choose which of the two latter images is 
identical to the original. The results are tabulated and examined statistically. Any bias in 
the data represents the fact that the observers could distinguish between the original and 
watermarked images, and serves as a measure of the fidelity of the watermarking 
process. 
 
A second, more general experimental paradigm for measuring quality allows the 
observers more latitude in their choice of responses. Rather than selecting one of two 
images as ‘better’, observers are asked to rate the quality of an image, sometimes with a 
reference to a second image. For example, the ITU-R Rec. 500 quality rating scale 
specifies a quality scale and an impairment scale that can be used for judging the quality 
of television pictures (ITU 2000). These scales, summarised in Table 3.1, have been 
suggested for use in the evaluation of image watermarking quality (Kutter and Hartung 
2000). 
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Figure 3.4 A two alternative, forced choice experiment studying image fidelity. 
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Five-Grade Scale 
Quality Impairment 
5       Excellent 5     Imperceptible 
4       Good 4     Perceptible, but not annoying 
3        Fair 3     Slight annoying 
2        Poor 2     Annoying 
1        Bad 1     Very annoying 
Table 3.1 Quality and impairment scale as defined in ITU-R Rec. 500 
 
3.9.3 Automated Evaluation 
 
The experimental techniques outlined previously can provide very accurate information 
about the fidelity of watermarked content. However, they can be very expensive and are 
not easily repeated. An alternative approach is the use of an algorithmic quality measure 
based on a perceptual model. The goal of a perceptual model is to predict the response 
of an observer. The immediate advantages of such a system are that it is cheaper and 
faster to implement and the evaluation can be repeated so that different methods can be 
compared directly. 
 
Ideally, a perceptual model (function) intended for automated fidelity tests should 
predict the results of tests performed with human observers. However, for the purposes 
of comparing the fidelity of different watermarking algorithms, or watermarking 
strength, it is sufficient for the model to provide a value that is related to the results of 
human tests, that is to produce a measure of the perceptual distances between 
watermarked and unwatermarked images (Cox et al. 2002). One of the simplest distance 
functions is the mean squared error (MSE). This is defined as: 
 
• The mean square error (MSE), 
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which is the averaged term by term difference between the original image, I, and the 
watermarked image, I’. Although MSE is often used as a rough test of a watermarking 
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system’s fidelity impact, it is known to provide a poor estimate of the true fidelity 
(Girod 1993). 
 
Some perceptual distance functions are asymmetric. In these functions, the two 
arguments have slightly different interpretations. By convention, the first argument is 
interpreted as an original image, and the second as a watermarked version of it. For 
example, one commonly used asymmetric distance is based on the reciprocal of the 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This is defined as: 
 
• The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), 
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• The peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), 
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where max I is the peak value of the original image (usually 255 for 8 bit grey-scale 
image). The PSNR of an image is a typical measure used for assessing image fidelity by 
considering that the just noticeable distortions are uniform in all coefficients in a 
specific domain, such as spatial domain, frequency domain, or some other transform 
domain. It is well known that these distance functions are not well correlated with the 
human visual system (Kutter and Hartung 2000). In this thesis, PSNR is used as a 
measure of image fidelity. 
 
There are a few assumptions that were made: 
• All images will be stored in their original sizes. 
• All tampering is done locally, using image editing software and includes: 
o Cut and paste (including cutting from another watermarked image) 
o Cloning 
o Healing brush 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter proposes two types of strict authentication watermarking for medical 
images. This chapter is structured as follows: 
 
• Section 4.2 proposes strict authentication watermarking for ultrasound images. 
In this scheme, we define region of interest (ROI) by taking the smallest 
rectangle around an image. The watermark is generated from hashing the area of 
interest. The embedding region is considered to be outside the region of interest 
as to preserve the area from distortion as a result from watermarking. 
  
• Section 4.3 proposes another strict authentication watermarking that is robust to 
some degree of JPEG compression (SAW-JPEG). JPEG compression will be 
reviewed. To embed a watermark in the spatial domain, we have to make sure 
that the embedded watermark will survive JPEG quantization process. 
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4.2 Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) 
 
We propose a strict authentication watermarking for ultrasound images, where the 
watermark embedded will remain lossless in storage and transmission. In order to 
reduce the effects on the image, it is to be embedded into a constrained area that is 
defined to be outside the ROI. In this scheme, we define region of interest (ROI) by 
taking the smallest rectangle around an image (figure 4.1). This border will be used for 
our watermark embedding later. The watermark is generated from hashing the area of 
interest. The embedding region is considered to be outside the region of interest as to 
preserve the area from distortion as a result from watermarking. Our scheme is an 
enhancement of the scheme proposed by Cao et al (2003) with reversible capability. 
 
    
      (a) gallbladder                         (b) kidney 
    
         ( c) spleen                (d) vein 
Figure 4.1. Ultrasound images with a border drawn around them 
 
4.2.1 Watermark 
 
The watermark is generated by creating a hash value from the region of interest (inside 
the rectangle), X of size m x n. .The pixels will be arranged in a string, S.  
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)......( ),()1,2(),1()2,1()1,1( nmm XXXXXBS = ,    (4.1) 
 
where Xmn is the 8 bit binary value of each pixel. 
The hash value is obtained by applying a hash function to the string 
 
)(SHash Η=       (4.2) 
 
where H is any hash function such as MD5 and SHA256. 
 
4.2.2 Embedding Region and Domain 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Embedding region 
 
The embedding region is considered to be outside the region of interest in order to 
prevent distortion to the area as a result of adding the watermark. In an ultrasound 
image, the embedding region is normally a dark region with pixel values 0. This feature 
will be exploited to create a reversible or invertible watermarking. 
 
In strict authentication watermarking, it is vital that the system will detect any change to 
the image. Fragile watermarking is the most appropriate as any change in the image will 
also affect the watermark. Least Significant Bit (LSB) watermarking has an advantage 
as the method of choice, as it is well known that LSB is vulnerable and easy to 
manipulate. 
Region of Interest 
Embedding Region 
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4.2.3 Security 
 
A watermark is secure if it is able to resist intentional tampering by an attacker. This 
would include remaining secure even when the attacker knows the algorithm for 
embedding and extracting the watermark. 
 
The strength of the security of the watermark will depend on the key chosen. A typical 
attack would involve removing the watermark, changing the image, then recalculating 
and embedding the new hash value into the embedding area. If the key for calculating 
the hash value remains secret, then the system may be considered secure. The secret key 
can be used to create the hash value and to create a random embedding. These will be 
examined in turn. 
 
• Key for hashing 
A key can be used to create the hash for the selected region. In this method, the sender 
and recipient will use the same key to carry out the hash function. The hash value 
obtained will be used as the watermark. At the recipient end, the key will be used to 
carry out the hash function on the received image and the hash value will be compared 
with the hash extracted. 
 
Hash FunctionImage Hash value
 
Figure 4.3. Key for hash 
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• Key for embedding 
 
A key used for embedding will determine the random mapping of watermark values into 
the embedding region as in figure 4.4. 
 
                      
 
Figure 4.4. Hash value mapping in the embedding region 
 
This supposes that the number of points or pixels in the embedding region is greater 
than or equal to the number of bits in the hash value holds. As an example, suppose the 
pixels are arranged as a simple raster scan as in figure 4.5. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
11 12 13 14 15 
16 17 18 19 20 
Figure 4. 5. Embedding region of 5 x 4 pixels 
 
which may be described by the mapping function of equation 4.3: 
 
nxxf mod)( =      (4.3) 
 
where x is the bit position and { }hx ,1∈  and n is the total number of pixels available for 
embedding. In this example, we use h=20 to make full use of the embedding region. 
Applying equation 4.3, bit position one will be located in pixel number one, bit position 
h1 
h2 
h3 
. 
. 
. 
h256 
Embedding region 
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two will be located in pixel number 2 and so on. By using a key, k, the position will be 
randomised. If a simple function, e.g. equation 4.4 is applied, 
nkxxf mod)( =      (4.4) 
 
where k is a prime key, then the mapping will be a randomised one-to-one mapping. 
This is illustrated for k=37 and n=20 in table 4.1. 
 
X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
F(x) 18 15 12 9 6 3 20 17 14 11 8 5 2 19 16 13 10 7 4 1 
Table 4.1. Mapping for k=37, n=20 
 
The method may be extended so that a number, h, of hash values are distributed within 
a region having many more pixel points, n so that the results appears as a sparse random 
distribution. The method is illustrated for k=37, h= 20 and n=100 in table 4.2. 
 
x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
f(x) 38 75 12 49 86 23 60 97 34 71 8 45 82 19 56 93 30 67 4 41 
Table 4.2. Mapping for k=37, h=20,n=100 
 
If the embedding region is 10 x 10 pixels, then the distribution of embedding will be 
pictured as in figure 4.6. 
 
   19    11   
 3       14  
  6       17 
   9    1   
20    12    4  
     15    7 
      18    
10    2      
 13    5     
  16    8    
Figure 4.6. Distribution of embedding for k=37, h=20, n=100 
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This simple method relies on the use of symmetric keys, which has an associated 
problem of key management. This is beyond the scope of this research. In practice 
asymmetric key systems are favoured; these are discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2.4  Hashing – SHA256 
 
The Secure hash Algorithm (SHA) was developed by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) and published as a federal information processing standard 
(FIPS PUB 180) in 1990. The algorithm is an iterative, one-way hash function that can 
process a message to produce a condensed representation called a message digest. The 
algorithm enables the integrity of a message to be determined and any change to the 
message will, with a very high probability, result in a different message digest. This 
property is useful in the generation and verification of digital signatures and message 
authentication codes. It is based on a public/private key, and thus overcomes the 
problem of key management. 
 
4.2.5 Method 
 
SHA-256 may be incorporated into a watermarking algorithm as shown in Figure 4.7. 
The general methodology and principles as listed below: 
  
At sender site 
 
1) Define Area: The Region of Interest (ROI) is determined as the smallest 
rectangle that bounds the known image area. Figure 4.1 shows an example of a 
rectangle defining the ROI in an ultrasound image. 
2) SHA-256: The hash value for the whole image using SHA-256 is calculated. 
This produces a 256-bit one-way hash value that can be the basis of the 
watermark. 
3) Embed: The hash value is embedded into the Region of Non-Interest (RONI) in 
the LSB. The specific location is not important, as it is known that it will not 
affect the image under any circumstances. 
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At receiver site: 
 
1) Extract watermark: The watermark is extracted by recovering the LSB from 
the watermarking area. 
2) Flipping: In flipping, the LSB in the watermarking area are reset to their original 
values. This acts as the reversible function and is possible for any image that has 
an area of known constant. In the case of ultrasound images, this may be easily 
achieved by resetting all the bits to zero. 
3) SHA-256: the SHA-256 algorithm is applied to the received image and the hash 
value computed. 
4) Authentication: the hash value calculated in step 3 is compared to that 
extraction in step 2. If found to be the same, the image is authenticated. 
 
4.2.6 Experimental Results 
 
An 800 x 600 pixels ultrasound image was watermarked using the method described in 
section 4.2.5. The watermarked image was modified using the cloning tools of Adobe 
Photoshop CS2. The cloning area was around 50x50 pixels and the change may be seen 
as the image in figure 4.9. Figure 4.8 shows the results of hashing using SHA-256. 
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Figure 4.7 Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) System 
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(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.8 (a) Original image and its hash (b) Tampered image and its hash 
 
 
68fb5d32d1fcabd3b22d53da68a30667
0c8ff9a348623072080f8feb28764bfa 
838145455036aa5521d96d5d4657b8
b1d43be9107661ce492015bc999008
1d07 
Chapter 4. Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) 68 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Image difference 
 
Two blocks were then watermarked, using one LSB and two LSBs, increasing in the 
number of bits embedded to determine the capacity of LSB embedding before the 
recommended PSNR of 32dB was reached. Table 4.3 shows the result of embedding 
270kb up to 550kb in the region of non-interest. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Watermarked image with 550kb payload 
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Figure 4.11(a) Histogram of Original Image 
 
 
Figure 4.11(b) Histogram of watermarked image (550kb) 
 
Figure 4.11 (a-b) shows the image histogram of the original image and a watermarked 
image with 550 kb payload. The histogram clearly shows the dramatic increase in the 
pixels with values 1 and 3, but keeping the remaining pixels exactly the same. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) 70 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
Capacity (kb) PSNR (dB) 
270 249.6 
430 51.5 
475 42.9 
510 31.7 
550 27.4 
Table 4.3 Capacity and PSNR for 800x600 US Image 
 
4.2.7 Conclusion 
 
Watermarking in medical images holds great potential. From the large capacity 
available for embedding, a lot more information can be added to the image to make it 
more secure. Combining cryptography and compression will add security and more 
information to the limited capacity.  The most important aspect regarding watermarking 
for medical image communications is that the image still conforms to the DICOM 
image format after watermarking takes place.  In keeping distortion level very low, we 
could ensure that the watermarked image can still be valuable for other purposes, such 
as a case study for schools that does not disclose the patient’s confidential information. 
A lossless watermarking scheme capable of verifying the authenticity and integrity of 
DICOM images is proposed. In addition, the original image can be recovered at the 
receiver site with the whole image’s integrity being strictly verified. The watermarking 
scheme, including data embedding, extracting and verifying procedure were presented.  
Experimental results showed that such a scheme could embed a large payload while 
keeping distortion level very low. 
 
4.3 Strict Authentication Watermarking with JPEG Compression 
(SAW-JPEG) 
 
4.3.1 Image Compression 
 
Image compression seeks to reduce the number of bits required to represent the image 
information. Two fundamental properties used in image compression are removal of 
redundancy and reduction of irrelevant content. Irrelevant content may include 
information not perceived by the viewer, namely the human visual system (HVS). Three 
types of redundancy may be exploited: 
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• Spatial redundancy or correlation between neighbouring pixels 
• Spectral redundancy or correlation between different frequency bands 
• Temporal redundancy or correlation between adjacent frames in a sequence of 
images (in video applications). 
 
Compression algorithms can be divided into two main groups, lossless and lossy 
methods. In lossless compression schemes, only the redundancy is exploited, and the 
image is recorded in a more efficient manner. All the information is retained and so the 
reconstructed image is numerically identical to the original image. In lossy 
compression, information deemed irrelevant to the visual perception of the human 
viewer is discarded and so the compressed image cannot be perfectly reconstructed and 
distortion is introduced into the reconstructed image. 
 
While lossless compression does not harm a watermarking system in any way (the 
original data can be perfectly reconstructed), lossy compression methods introduce 
distortion that has to be taken into account in watermarking applications. Lossy 
compression techniques are nowadays being commonly used as a means to effect a 
reduction on the requirement for bandwidth and storage space. It is therefore necessary 
to study the effects of lossy image compression on watermarking systems. 
 
It should be observed that the design goal of lossy compression systems is opposed to 
that of watermark embedding systems. The HVS model of the compression system 
attempts to identify and discard perceptually insignificant information of the image, 
whereas the goal of the watermarking system is to embed the watermark information 
without altering the visual perception of the image. An optimal compression or de-
noising system would immediately discard any such watermark information. 
Fortunately, all current compression methods are not optimal and allow watermarking 
schemes to be devised that will embed watermark information that is robust. 
 
It remains unresolved how lossy compression should best be employed for the storage 
and transmission of medical images. There is little guidance from the scientific 
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literature, professional practice standards, regulatory authorities, or the common law. 
Although lossy compression schemes are included in medical standards such as 
DICOM, their clinical use is not defined; it is only that the technology is available for 
use at the discretion of the user or implementer. 
 
There is no good metric by which to judge lossy compression schemes or determine 
appropriate threshold levels for diagnostic use. Quantitative metrics based on an 
analysis of the image pixels such as Mean Squared Error (MSE) and Peak Signal-to-
Noise Ratio (PSNR) do not correlate well with observers’ opinions of image quality, or 
the measurement of observers’ performance when undertaking diagnosis. Metrics based 
on models of human visual perception are still in their infancy. They have not been 
thoroughly compared to observer performance for medical applications (Clunie 2000). 
 
Hybrid lossless/lossy compression schemes have been developed for medical 
applications. These identify regions of images that are determined by some criterion to 
be of little or no clinical interest. These regions are then either discarded or compressed 
with greater loss. The remaining regions, which contain the regions of clinical interest, 
are compressed using a lossless compression scheme. This approach can result in a high 
compression overall and retain the effective quality of a lossless compression scheme. 
The difficulty is to determine the areas of clinical interest. There has been work to find 
automate algorithms, but the only reliable method has been to determine regions defined 
by physical characteristics Some early CT compression schemes did not encode 
information outside the circular reconstructed area at all (perimeter coding) and were 
very effective. However, if such areas are filled with a constant pixel value then most 
general-purpose lossless image compression schemes perform equally well. 
 
4.3.2 JPEG Compression 
 
JPEG (Wallace 1991) is currently the most frequently used compression algorithm for 
medical imaging. For example it is included within the DICOM standard. Improved 
compression algorithms such as JPEG2000, will replace JPEG in time. For the purposes 
of this work, the watermarking method will focus specifically on JPEG, although the 
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method should be extensible to other compression schemes based on a block 
compression scheme. 
 
In this section, we briefly review the JPEG lossy compression standard (Wallace 1991). 
At the input to the JPEG encoder, the source image, X, is grouped into ρ nonoverlapping 
8x8 blocks, Xp. Each block is sent sequentially to the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). 
Instead of representing each 8x8 matrix, we can rewrite it as a 64x1 vector following the 
“zigzag” order (Wallace 1991). Therefore the DCT coefficients, Fp, of the vector, Xp, 
can be considered as a linear transformation of Xp with a 64x64 transformation matrix 
D, such that, 
 
Fp = DXp      (4.5) 
 
The two-dimensional DCT of an M x N image X is defined as follows: 
 
10
10
,
2
)12(
cos
2
)12(
cos
1
0
1
0 −≤≤
−≤≤++
= ∑∑
−
=
−
=
Nq
Mp
N
qn
M
pmXB
M
m
N
n
mnqppq
pipi
αα  



≤≤
=
=
MpM
pM
p 1,/2
0,/1
α   



≤≤
=
=
NqN
qN
q 1,/2
0,/1
α   (4.6) 
 
The values Bpq are called the DCT coefficients of X. The DCT is an invertible transform. 
Each of the 64 DCT coefficients is uniformly quantized with a 64-element quantization 
table, Q. 
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16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61 
12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55 
14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56 
14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62 
18 22 37 56 68 109 103 77 
24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92 
49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101 
72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99 
Figure 4.12. JPEG quantization table 
 
In JPEG, the same table is used on all blocks of an image. Quantization is defined as the 
division of each DCT coefficient by its corresponding quantizer step size, and rounding 
to the nearest integer: 
))(
)(()(~
vQ
vF
ndIntegerRouvf pp ≡ ,     (4.7) 
 
where v = 1…64. In equation (4.7), pf~  is the output of the quantizer. We define pF
~
, a 
quantized approximation of Fp, as 
 
)()(~~ vQvfF pp ⋅≡       (4.8) 
 
In addition to quantization, JPEG also includes scan order conversion DC differential 
encoding, and entropy coding. 
 
Inverse DCT (IDCT) is used to convert pF~ to the spatial domain image block pX~  
 
pp FDX
~~ 1−
=        (4.9) 
 
All blocks are then tiled to form a decoded image frame. Theoretically, the results of 
IDCT are real numbers. However the brightness of an image is usually represented by 
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an 8-bit integer from 0 to 255 and thus a rounding process mapping those real numbers 
to integers is necessary. 
 
8 x 8 Block
Image DCT Quantizer Entropy Encoder
Entropy Decoder Dequantizer IDCT Reconstructed8 x 8 image
Compressed
image data
Compressed
image data
JPEG Encoder
JPEG Decoder
 
Figure 4.13. JPEG Encoder and decoder 
 
To embed a watermark in the spatial domain, it is necessary to ensure that the embedded 
watermark will survive JPEG quantization process. JPEG processes images in 8 x 8 
blocks, and so the method in which the watermark is embedded should be based on this 
same block structure. The process may be illustrated by encoding an 8 x 8 sub-image 
using JPEG. Consider if a ‘1’ is embedded into the whole of the LSB plane of the 8 x 8 
block as depicted by figure 4.14. 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Figure 4.14.  ‘1’ bit embedded in 8x8 block 
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After the DCT transform of the block, figure 4.15 is the result. 
 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Figure 4.15. DCT Transform of figure 4.14 
 
To survive the quantization process, the value must be preserved through transformation 
and inverse transformation, that is  
pp FF
~
=
     (4.10) 
To achieve this, )(
)(
vQ
vFp
 must be the integer and have no effect on the rounding process. 
In particular the DC quantization coefficient should be equal to the dc component in 
order to preserve an integer result, and all other quantization coefficients should be 
scaled accordingly. For higher compression rate, to preserve an integer value, the 
embedded level must be increased, which will naturally have an effect on the quality of 
the image. 
 
By designing the watermark embedding algorithm around the properties of the 
compression scheme, it is possible to preserve the watermark values. In this case, a 
priori knowledge of the quantization algorithm allows the DC coefficient to be 
unchanged through the compression/decompression process. 
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4.3.3 Method 
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Figure 4.16. Watermarking scheme 
 
The complete process is shown in figure 4.16 and comprises of the following steps: 
 
1) Define area: This will define the Region of interest (ROI) where the smallest 
rectangle is obtained. Please refer to section 4.2.5. 
2) SHA256: refer to section 4.2.5. 
3) Embedding: Embed the hash value in the Region of Non-Interest (RONI) in the 
LSB. Since JPEG uses 8x8 blocks, we try to embed 1-bit in an 8x8 block. We only need 
256 8x8 blocks to be able to embed the hash value. 
4) JPEG Compression: Compression is performed on the watermarked image. 
5) Extraction: The watermark is recovered from the watermarking area. 
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6) Authentication: The original hash and the extracted hash value are compared. 
 
4.3.4 Experimental Results 
 
An ultrasound image of 800x600x8 with a watermark embedded in RONI was subject 
to increasing levels of JPEG compression. The compression was performed using a 
quality factor in Matlab 6.5.1 to produce files with .jpg extension. 
 
The following are the results. Table 4.4 shows that the watermark is robust to a high 
compression rate up to 90.6%. The JPEG image quality threshold is 60 for the least 
significant bit embedding. The image quality threshold is increased to 61 for 2nd and 3rd 
LSB manipulations. 
 
Manipulation Image 
Quality 
Threshold 
Compression 
(%) 
PSNR 
(dB) 
1st LSB 60 90.6 40.75 
2nd LSB 61 90.4 40.84 
3rd LSB 61 90.4 40.84 
Table 4.4. LSB Embedding and Image Quality Threshold 
 
Figure 4.17 shows the original 800x600 US image and the compressed watermarked 
image with quality 60. This has the effect of changing some pixel values, with a marked 
effect on areas of abrupt change resulting in the increase of pixel values 2 – 10 (figure 
4.18). The effect of adding the watermark is evident by the peaks of pixel value 0 and 1. 
JPEG loses definition, particularly at high frequencies, which has the effect of low pass 
or smoothing filter. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 4.17. a) Original 800x600 US image b) compressed watermarked image with quality 60 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.18. a) Image histogram of figure 4.17(a);  
b) Image histogram of compressed image of figure 4.17(b) 
 
An 800x600 ultrasound image was watermarked with its hash and then compressed with 
quality 60 in Matlab 6.5.1. The hash value of the original was recorded as 
“fcc29cbb8ea81be407cdd93e0326bf2bb68dca3d7872c9b6a033a981e184f989”, and the 
hash value of the compressed image was extracted. Figure 4.19 shows (a) the original 
800x600 ultrasound image, (b) the watermarked original image and (c) the watermarked 
image after compression with quality 60. The extracted hash value was 
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“fcc29cbb8ea81be407cdd93e0326bf2bb68dca3d7872c9b6a033a981e184f989”, and is 
exactly the same as the original hash. This shows that the watermark can survive JPEG 
compression with Matlab 6.5.1 quality 60. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.19. (a) original image (b) Watermarked image ( c) the image after compression  
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4.3.5 Conclusion 
 
A lossless watermarking scheme is proposed that is robust to lossy JPEG compression 
and at the same time is able to verify the authenticity and integrity of medical images. 
The watermarking scheme, including data embedding, extracting and verifying 
procedure were presented. Experimental results showed that such a scheme could 
embed and extract the watermark at a high compression rate. Combining cryptography 
and compression will add security to the medical images. In keeping the distortion level 
low, we could make sure that the watermarked image can still be valuable for other 
purposes, such as case studies in schools, but without disclosing a patient’s confidential 
information. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Authentication Watermarking with Tamper 
Detection and Recovery (AW-TDR) 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we present an efficient and effective watermarking method for image 
tamper detection and recovery. This chapter is structured as follows: 
 
• Section 5.2 reviews authentication watermarking by Wong (1998) as a basis for 
discussion on vector quantization counterfeiting attacks. 
• Section 5.3 describes vector quantization (VQ) counterfeiting attacks on block-
wise independent watermarking schemes. 
• Section 5.4 discusses a few techniques as countermeasures against VQ 
counterfeiting attacks. These include increasing block dimension, breaking 
block-wise independent and using a hierarchical watermarking technique. 
• Section 5.5 proposes an authentication watermarking technique with tamper 
detection and recovery (AW-TDR). 
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5.2 Block-based Authentication Watermark 
 
A block-based watermarking technique (Wong 1998) used an M x N image X and a 
binary watermark image W. In practice, this step is usually achieved by tiling the 
original image with a smaller logo image. 
 
 
Figure 5. 1 Tiling of logo image in Wong’s scheme 
 
The original image X is partitioned into O x P pixel blocks, {X1, X2, …}; where Xr 
denotes such blocks. Likewise, the watermark image is partitioned into blocks, Wr. For 
each block Xr, a corresponding block rX
~
 is formed by setting the least significant bit of 
each pixel to zero. A cryptographic hash (e.g.,. MD5 or SHA) of transformed block rX
~
 
and image dimensions is computed. 
 
)~,,( rr XNMH Η=      (5.1) 
 
The signature of a block is formed by XORing the computed hash with the watermark 
pattern and encrypting the result with a public key encryption algorithm. 
 
),( privaterrr KeyWHEncryptS ⊕=     (5.2) 
 
where ⊕  denotes the bitwise XOR operator. Finally, the signature rS  is inserted in Xr as 
the least significant bits of the block. Note that the application of this procedure 
independently on each block produces the watermarked image. 
 
During watermark verification similar steps are followed. First the candidate image X~ is 
partitioned into blocks rX
~
. Signature rS
~
 is read from the least significant bits of each 
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block, rX
~
. rX
~
s are formed by setting LSBs to zero and rH
~
s are calculated using image 
sizes and rX
~
s. Finally, watermark image blocks are recovered by XORing the hash 
values with decrypted signatures from each block. 
 
rrr HKeypublicSDecryptW
~),~(~ ⊕=     (5.3) 
 
Any changes in the pixel values of a block alter either the decrypted signature or (with 
very high probability) the output of the hash function. Theoretically, a randomly 
generated block may carry the correct watermark pattern. Nevertheless, the probability 
of such an occurrence is practically negligible. In either case, the recovered watermark 
block rW
~
 will be significantly different than the embedded watermark block. As a 
result, when a group of pixels in a spatial region are altered, the manipulation will be 
detected by the change in the corresponding region of the binary watermark image. On 
the other hand, it is possible to replace an entire image block with another without 
arousing suspicion, provided that both blocks bear the same watermark pattern. This 
observation is the basis for the vector quantization attack described in the next section. 
 
5.3 Vector Quantization Counterfeiting Attack 
 
A counterfeiting attack on block-wise independent watermarking schemes was proposed 
by Holliman and Memon (2000). The attacker approximates an image for which he 
wishes to create a forgery by using a collage of authentic blocks from watermarked 
images. Since the embedding and authentication processes are block-wise, the 
verification algorithm authenticates the collage image. Given a large enough database of 
watermarked images, the attacker can ensure that the counterfeit collage image has the 
same visual appearance as his original unwatermarked image. 
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Figure 5.2  Vector quantization attack. The attacker approximates an image (on the left) 
by a collage of authentic blocks from watermarked images (center). The resulting 
image (right) is visually identical to the original and is deemed valid by the 
watermark detector. 
 
5.4 Countermeasures Against Counterfeiting Attack 
 
In this section a number of modifications on Wong’s scheme that have been proposed as 
countermeasures against the vector quantization attack are discussed. 
 
• Increasing Block Dimensions 
Vector quantization process depends on two key factors: the size and the number of 
image blocks in a codebook. Smaller size blocks can be approximated more 
accurately given a fixed size codebook. Similarly, better approximations can be 
obtained as the number of blocks in the codebook increases. Therefore, increasing 
the block dimensions used in the watermarking process can reduce the possibility of 
a reasonable forgery. Larger blocks also decrease the number of authentic blocks 
that can be obtained from one image and this will degrade the quality of forgery by 
reducing the codebook size. 
 
This countermeasure, however, does not thwart the attack completely. If the set of 
watermarked images available to the attacker is quite large, reasonable forgeries can 
still be produced. Moreover, using larger and larger blocks also impairs the tamper 
localisation accuracy of the watermark. 
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• Breaking Block-Wise Independence: Neighbourhood Dependent Blocks 
An alternative method of eliminating the VQ attack is to eliminate the block wise 
independence of the watermark. In particular, the signature embedded in block Xr 
may be calculated using a larger support Xr, which overlaps the neighbouring 
blocks. This technique is very similar to block chaining modes used in block 
encryption techniques (e.g., CBC mode in DES – see Menezes, Oorchoot et al. 
1997). Using this scheme, a collage of individually watermarked blocks of an image 
is no longer authenticated by the watermarking extraction process because the larger 
support covering the neighbouring blocks is not preserved. 
 
• Hierarchical Block-Based Watermarking 
A technique that embeds and extracts a watermark in a multilevel hierarchy was 
proposed (Celik et al. 2002). On the lowest level, the image, X is partitioned into O 
x P non-overlapping blocks. At each successive level, the image is partitioned into 
blocks that in turn are composed of 2 x 2 blocks at the preceding level of the 
hierarchy. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Partitioning of an image and the resulting four level hierarchical block structure 
 
Although the method claimed it could eliminate the vulnerabilities of Wong’s 
(1998) scheme to VQ attack, it is found that the method also compromises on the 
accuracy of localisation. For example, using an ultrasound image of size 800 x 600 
pixels, the image will be partitioned, resulting in four level hierarchical block 
structure with the smallest block of 100 x 75 pixels. 
Blocks grow 
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Figure 5.4 Partitioning of image size 800 x 600 pixels 
 
5.5 Authentication Watermarking with Tamper Detection and 
Recovery (AW-TDR) 
 
In this section, an efficient and effective digital watermarking method for image tamper 
detection and recovery is presented. The method is based on four concepts introduced 
from the literature: 1) block-based (Fridrich and Goljan 1999); 2) separating 
authentication bits and recovery bits (Lin and Chang 2001); 3) hierarchical (Celik et al 
2002); and 4) average intensity as an image feature (Lou and Liu 2000). The method is 
efficient as it only uses simple operations such as parity check and comparison between 
average intensities. It is effective because the scheme inspects the image hierarchically 
with the inspection view increasing along with the hierarchy so that the accuracy of 
tamper localisation can be ensured. This scheme can perform both tamper detection and 
recovery for tampered images. Tamper detection is achieved through a block-based, 
inspection and recovery of a tampered block and relies on its feature information hidden 
in another block, which can be determined by a one-dimensional transformation. 
 
5.5.1 Torus Automorphism 
 
Torus automorphism is a kind of dynamic system. A dynamic system is a system whose 
states change with time t. When t is discreet, a dynamic system can be presented as 
iteration of a function f,  St+1 = f(St), where t Є Z = {0, 1, 2, 3,… }, St, St+1 are the states 
at time t and t+1, respectively (Voyatzis and Pitas 1996a). A two-dimensional Torus 
automorphism can be considered as a permutation function or a spatial transformation 
800 x 600 
400 x 300 
200 x 150 
100 x 75 
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of a plane region. This transformation can be performed using a 2 x 2 matrix A with 
constant elements. More specifically, a state St+1 or a point (xi+1, yi+1) can be 
transformed from another state St or another point (xi,yi) by 
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where 1, =∈ AZai , and A has eigenvalues },1,0,1{2,1 −−∈ Rλ R is the set of rational 
numbers. The detailed characteristics of A are described in (Voyatzis and Pitas 1996b, 
Voyatzis and Pitas 1996a). A set of successive points {S0, S1, S2, …}, generated by 
equation (5.4) composes an orbit φ of the system and the initial point S0 = (x0,y0) 
classifies φ into two categories. When x0 and/or y0 are irrational, φ is infinite. When 
both x0 and y0 are rational, φ is chaotic and periodic at every R times, SR = S0. R is 
called the recurrence time. Voyatzis and Pitas (1996) presented a one-parameter, two 
dimensional, discrete Torus automorphism as in equation (5.5), for creating a unique 
and random mapping of the pixels within an image: 
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where [ ] [ ]1,01,0),( −×−∈ NNyx ii  and [ ]1,0 −∈ Nk . The recurrence time R depends 
upon the parameters k, N, and the initial point (x0,y0). In most cases, R is equal to N-1 
or N+1, when N is prime (Voyatzis and Pitas 1996b, Voyatzis and Pitas 1996a). 
 
5.5.2 Watermark Embedding 
 
The watermarking embedding procedure is described in this section. Each image is of 
size M x N pixels where M and N are assumed to be a multiple of six and the number of 
grey levels is 256. 
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• Preparation 
We need to prepare a one to one block mapping sequence A → B→ C→ D → 
… → A for watermarking embedding, where each symbol denotes an individual 
block. The intensity feature of block A will be embedded in block B, and the 
intensity feature of block B will be embedded in block C, etc. Since the number 
of blocks in each dimension of most images can be hardly be a prime number, 
we cannot obtain a one to one mapping among the blocks by applying equation 
(5.5), based on the analysis in (Voyatzis and Pitas 1996b). Instead, a 1D 
transformation was used: 
 
1]mod)[( +×= bNBkB
r
,     (5.6) 
 
where ],1[,, bNkBB ∈
v
 , k is a secret key ( prime number), and Nb is the total 
number of blocks in the image. 
 
The generation algorithm of the block-mapping sequence is as follows: 
 
1. Divide the image into non-overlapping blocks of 6x6 pixels 
2. Assign a unique and consecutive integer },...,3,2,1{ bNB ∈ to each block 
from left to right and top to bottom, where Nb= (M/6) x (N/6) 
3. Randomly pick a prime number ],1[ bNk ∈  
4. For each block number B, apply equation (5.6) to obtain Br , the number 
of its mapping block 
5. Record all pairs of B and B
r
 to form the block mapping sequence 
 
k B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 21 22 23 24 
23 B
r
 
24 7 30 13 36 19 2 25 4 27 10 33 
26 B
r
 
27 13 39 25 11 37 23 9 27 13 39 25 
 
Table 5.1 Mapping of blocks with k=23,26 and Nb=40 
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Note that the secret key, k, must be a prime in order to obtain a one to one 
mapping; otherwise, the period is less than Nb and a one to many mapping may 
occur. Table 5.1 lists some parts of the mapping sequence generated with 
Nb=40, k=23 and 26 respectively. In this table, B
r
starts to repeat at B=21 when 
k=26, which is not a prime. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Image mapping using toral automorphism. Blocksize=200  k= 5 
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Figure 5.6 image mapping using toral automorphism. Blocksize=8  k= 3739 
 
Figure 5.5 and 5.6 shows an 800x600 ultrasound image divided into equal size 
blocks and mapped using toral automorphism. 
 
• Authentication watermark and recovery watermark generation 
In the schemes proposed by Wong (1998) and Celik et al. (2002) a signature was 
generated for each block in order to localise tamper. Signature generation is 
computationally expensive and requires more bits for embedding, thus it will have 
an effect on the quality of the watermarked image. 
 
In this section a case of using intensity average comparisons and parity bits as the 
authentication watermark is presented. To localise tamper in a block, the watermark 
needs to be embedded directly into that block. If a block is being tampered locally, 
the intensities of the pixels involved will be changed. This will also change the 
average intensity of the block concerned. To ensure that this is not changed, a parity 
check will be used. However, a parity check alone will not guarantee that the block 
has not been changed, because local tampering usually causes burst error (Cox et al. 
2002), meaning that if more than one bit has been changed, a parity check is no 
Chapter 5. Authentication Watermarking With Tamper Detection and Recovery (AW-TDR) 93 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
longer useful. Using ECC will help solve this issue, but again more watermark bits 
will be needed. To overcome this, the intensity comparison is used as another guard 
if a parity check fails. This feature will also be used to break block wise 
independent. To break block wise independent, the intensity of the block is 
compared to the intensity of a larger block. Let B denote the bigger block (figure 
5.7) and the smaller or sub block as Bs, then the average intensity of B is 
 
16
)(
_
1615321 PPPPPBAvg
+++++
=
K
   (5.7) 
 
and the average intensity of sub block is 
 
4
)(
_
6521 PPPPBAvg s
+++
=     (5.8) 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
P5 P6 P7 P8 
P9 P10 P11 P12 
P13 P14 P15 P16 
Figure 5.7 A 4x4 Block B 
 
The intensity of each sub block will be used as the recovery watermark, and will be 
embedded in a block mapped by equation 5.6. This is to ensure that if the block is 
tampered with, the recovery bits will be highly likely to be available. In order to 
consider the block size suitable for recovery, the average intensities of 4x4, 3x3 and 
2x2 blocks of the whole image were created to see the visual effect for each block 
size and the results of the signature image are presented in figure 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 
respectively. The 4x4 signature image loses fine details with clearly visible block 
effect. The 3x3 signature image has better quality, with fine details and less visible 
block effect. The 2x2 signature is the best without losing any fine details and no 
visible block effect. 
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Figure 5.8 Signature image using 4x4 block.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Signature image using 3x3 block 
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Figure 5.10. Signature image using 2x2 block. Quality is good. No visual block effect. A good 
candidate for recovery. 
 
The choice of which signature image to use will depend on: 
 
1. How many LSBs will be used, which is the answer to how much 
degradation is allowed for the watermark. 
2. How will the recovered image be used? Will it be considered as 
authentic? If it is not, will it be used as an indication of the location and 
the nature of the tampering? 
 
LSB is suggested, to minimise the degradation as medical images are very strict 
with the quality. The recovered image, however, will not be considered authentic 
and will not be used for any clinical purposes. One possibility for the purpose of 
recovery is to help in the investigation to find the motive and the person responsible 
for the tampering. A 3x3 sub block in a 6x6 block is suggested to accommodate two 
authentication bits and seven recovery bits to be embedded in the LSB of each pixel. 
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• Embedding 
For each block B of 6x6 pixels, divide it into four sub-blocks of 3x3 pixels. The 
watermark in each sub-block is a 3-tuple (v, p, r), where both v and p are 1-bit 
authentication watermark, and r is a 7-bit recovery watermark for the corresponding 
sub-block within block A mapped to B. The following algorithm describes how the 
3-tuple watermark of each sub-block is generated and embedded: 
 
1. Set the LSB of each pixel within the block to zero and compute the average 
intensity of the block and each of its four sub-blocks, denoted by avg_B and 
avg_Bs, respectively. 
 
2. Generate the authentication watermark, v, of each sub-block as: 



=
0
1
v     
,
,__
otherwise
BavgBsavgif ≥
    (5.9) 
 
3. Generate the parity check bit, p, of each sub-block as : 



=
,0
,1
otherwise
oddisnumif
p      (5.10) 
        where num is the total number of 1s in the seven MSBs of avg_Bs. 
 
4. From the mapping sequence generated in the preparation step, obtain block 
A whose recovery information will be stored in block B. 
5. Compute the average intensity of each corresponding sub-block As within A, 
and denote it avg_As. 
6. Obtain the recovery intensity, r, of As by taking the seven MSBs in avg_As. 
7. Embed the 3-tuple watermark (v, p, r), 9 bits in all, onto the LSB of of each 
pixel in Bs. 
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1 2 3    
 4 5 6    
7 8 9    
      
      
      
       Block A  
 
1 2 3    
4 5 6    
7 8 9    
      
      
      
        Block B 
Figure 5.11(a) Watermark generation and embedding location 
 
Avg_As 
=(I1+I2+I3+…+I9)/9 
r =a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 
v, p of B 
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Find Avg_B
Find parity bit
p
Find Avg_Bs
Embed in LSB of
Bs
Mapping Blocks
A
Compare Avg_B
and avg_Bs
v
Watermarked
Bs
Find intensity As
r
 
Figure 5.11(b) AW-TDR embedding scheme 
 
5.5.3 Tamper detection 
 
The test image is first divided into non-overlapping blocks of 6x6 pixels, as in the 
watermarking embedding process. For each block denoted as B
r
, the LSBs of each pixel 
in B
r
 were set to zero and compute its average intensity, denoted as avg_ B
r
. A 2-level 
detection is then performed. In level-1 detection, each 3x3 sub-block within one block is 
examined. In level-2 detection, a 6x6 block is treated as one unit. Level-3 detection is 
for VQ attack resilience only. The procedure of our hierarchical tamper detection 
scheme is described in the following: 
 
• Level-1 detection. 
For each sub-block B
r
s of 3x3 pixels within the block B
r
, perform the following 
steps: 
1. Extract v and p from B
r
s. 
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2. Set the LSBs of each pixel within each B
r
s to zero and compute the average 
intensity for each sub-block B
r
s, denoted as avg_ B
r
s. 
3. Count the total number of 1s in avg_ B
r
s and denote it as Ps. 
4. Set the parity check bit p’ of B
r
s to 1 if Ps is odd, otherwise, set it to 0. 
5. Compare p’ with p. If they are not equal, mark B
r
s as tampered and complete 
the detection for B
r
s. 
6. Set the algebraic relation v’=1 if avg_ B
r
s>=avg_ B
r
, otherwise, set it to 0. 
7. Compare v’ with v. If they are not equal, mark B
r
s as tampered and complete 
the detection for B
r
s; otherwise mark it valid. 
 
• Level-2 detection. 
For each block of size 6x6 pixels, mark this block tampered if any of its sub-blocks 
is marked tampered; otherwise mark it valid. 
 
• Level-3 detection. 
For each valid block B
r
 of size 6x6 pixels, perform the following steps: 
1. Find the block number of block C, where block C is the one in which the 
intensity feature of block B
r
is embedded. 
2. Locate block C. 
3. If block C is marked tampered, assume block B
r
 is valid and complete the 
test. 
4. If block C is valid, perform the following steps: 
a. Obtain the 7-bit should-be intensity of each B
r
s by extracting the 
LSBs from each pixels in the corresponding block within block C, 
padding one zero to the end to make an 8-bit value. 
b. Compare with avg_ B
r
s and mark B
r
 tampered if they are different. 
 
5.5.4 Image Recovery 
 
After the detection stage, all the blocks are marked either valid or tampered. Only the 
tampered blocks are recovered and the valid blocks are left as they are. For 
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convenience, we call the tampered block, block B and the block embedded with its 
intensity, block C. The restoration procedure for each tampered block is described as 
follows: 
 
1. Calculate the block number for block C. 
2. Locate block C 
3. Obtain the 7-bit intensity of each sub-block within block B, padding one zero to 
the end to make an 8-bit value. 
4. Replace the new intensity of each pixel within the sub-block with this new 8-bit 
intensity. 
5. Repeat step 3 and 4 for all sub-blocks within block B. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
(a) 
48 23 46 21 44 19 42 17 
40 15 38 13 36 11 34 9 
32 7 30 5 28 3 26 1 
24 47 22 45 20 43 18 41 
16 39 14 37 12 35 10 33 
8 31 6 29 4 27 2 25 
(b) 
Figure 5.12. (a) An 8x6 block with block 18,19,26 and 27 tampered, 
 (b) Recovery bits location  
 
Figure 5.12(a) shows an 8x6 block and each block is given a number from 1 to 48. By 
using the transformation given by equation 5.3, with k=23, the transformation is given 
in figure 5.12(b). If, for example, blocks 18, 19, 26 and 27 were tampered with, all 
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blocks will be recovered since from the mapping block, as the recovery bits are stored in 
blocks 6, 23, 31 and 46 respectively. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
(a) 
 
48 23 46 21 44 19 42 17 
40 15 38 13 36 11 34 9 
32 7 30 5 28 3 26 1 
24 47 22 45 20 43 18 41 
16 39 14 37 12 35 10 33 
8 31 6 29 4 27 2 25 
(b) 
Figure 5.13 (a) An 8x6 block with blocks 1,24 and 48 are tampered,  
(b) Recovery bits stored in block 1,24 and 25  
 
If three blocks 1, 24 and 48 were tampered with, the only block that will be recovered is 
block 24. The reason being that information for block 1 is embedded in block 24, which 
is tampered with resulting in a loss of information. The same applies to block 48, where 
the recovery bits were embedded in block 1 which has been tampered with. The 
recovery bits for block 24 however were embedded in block 25 that has not been 
tampered with. 
 
5.5.5 Experimental Results 
 
• Missing detection 
In evaluating the proposed authentication watermarking with tamper detection and 
recovery (AW-TDR), different manipulations on an ultrasound image, two fingerprint 
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images and a military image were tested to obtain the miss detection rate for level-1 and 
level-2 detection. 
 
The watermarked ultrasound image was manipulated using cloning tool from Adobe 
Photoshop CS. The manipulated area is ~30 x 50 pixels. 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Original image 
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Watermarked Image
 
 
Figure 5.15 Watermark embedded PSNR = 54.1483 dB 
 
 
Figure 5.16 Tampered image 
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Tamper detect
 
Figure 5.17 Level 1 detection with some areas undetected 
 
Tamper detect
 
Figure 5.18 Some areas undetected magnified 
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Tamper detect
 
Figure 5.19 level 2 detection 
 
Tamper detect
 
 
Figure 5.20. Magnified Level 2 detection 
 
Chapter 5. Authentication Watermarking With Tamper Detection and Recovery (AW-TDR) 106 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
 
Figure 5.21. Original fingerprint1 (from National Institute of Science and Technology [NIST] 
Science and Technical database http://www.nist.gov/srd/nistsd4.htm) 
 
 
Figure 5.22. Watermarked fingerprint1 PSNR = 54.5262 dB 
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Watermarked Image
 
 
Figure 5.23. Watermark embedded in fingerprint1 
 
 
Figure 5.24. Tampered watermarked fingerprint1 
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Tamper detect
 
 
Figure 5.25. Level 1 detection- fingerprint1  
 
Fingerprint1 was manipulated using healing brush tool and cloning tool. The 
manipulated sizes are ~60 x 50 and ~100 x 100 pixels. 
Tamper detect
 
 
Figure 5.26. Level 2 detection- fingerprint1 
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Figure 5.27. Watermarked fingerprint2 PSNR = 54.9982 dB 
 
 
Figure 5.28 Tampered watermarked fingerprint2 
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Figure 5.29.  Image Difference  
 
Fingerprint2 was manipulated using cut and paste and cloning tool. This time the 
manipulation size is smaller ranging from ~ 10 x10 to 40 x 100 pixels. 
Tamper detect
 
 
Figure 5.30. Level 1 detection – fingerprint2 
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Tamper detect
 
 
Figure 5.31. Level 2 detection – fingerprint2 
 
 
Figure 5.32. Original Nigeria 
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Figure 5.33. Watermarked Nigeria 
 
 
Figure 5.34. Tampered Nigeria 
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Tamper detect 
 
Figure 5.35. Level 1 detection- Nigeria 
 
Nigeria was manipulated by removing some objects from the image. Four people were 
removed including one person and his shadow at the centre. A Volkswagen at the 
bottom right corner was also removed. A small area in the sky was also manipulated. 
Paintbrush, healing brush and cloning tools were used. 
Tamper detect
 
Figure 5.36. Level 2 detection - Nigeria 
 
Table 5.2 shows the missing detection rate using level-1 and level-2 detection. For 
level-1 detection, we have a maximum of 16% of missing detection rate. We achieved at 
least 99.9% detection rate for level-2 detection. 
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 Ultrasound 
(800x600) 
Fingerprint1 
(512x512) 
Fingerprint2 
(512x512) 
Nigeria 
(600x376) 
Level1 10% 15% 13% 16% 
Level2 0.1% 0.06% 0.02% 0.03% 
Table 5.2. Miss detection rate 
 
• Recovery in the middle region 
We carried out another experiment to test the performance of our recovery algorithm to 
test when the tamper is made near to the centre of the image. For ultrasound images, 
this is highly likely because the region of interest happens to be in the centre of the 
image. We tampered with a watermarked image (k=3739) with tampering size of 20x20 
pixels (figure 5.37) and 100x100 pixels (figure 5.39). For the 20x20 tamper, one block 
situated at the middle is not recovered. For 100x100 tamper, seven blocks were not 
recovered including the block in the middle of the image. The analysis of this will be 
discussed in chapter 6. 
 
 
Figure 5.37. Tamper in the middle 20 x 20 pixel 
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Figure 5.38. Recovered image of figure 5.37 
 
Figure 5.38 shows that the block in the middle is not recovered, while the blocks around 
it have been recovered. 
 
Figure 5.39. Tamper in the middle 100 x 100 
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Figure 5.40. Recovered image of figure 5.39 
 
Figure 5.40 maintains that the block in the middle cannot be recovered by our method. 
In addition, some blocks at the vertical edge also cannot be recovered using our method. 
 
• Recovery rate 
An experiment to see the distribution of tampering, the size of the tampering effect and 
the rate of recovery was also carried out. We tampered with the watermarked (k=3739) 
image using spread-tampered blocks and single tampered blocks with a tampered area 
ranging from 10% to 50% as shown in figure 5.41 and figure 5.42. The spread-tampered 
blocks are the same size as the embedding blocks. Figure 5.43 shows the number of 
blocks that were not recovered from the single tampered block. We also changed the 
direction column-wise to see the effect. For a 10% column-wise single tampered block, 
we have a 100% recovery as in figure 5.44. This shows that the distance for those 
blocks and the mapped blocks were more than 1/10 of the image size. The results will 
be discussed further in chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.44 shows the number of un-recovered blocks for a single-tampered chunk. We 
obtained a 100% recovery for spread tampered blocks. The analysis will be discussed in 
chapter 6. Please see Appendix C for the recovered images. 
 
5.5.6 Conclusion 
 
We proposed a watermarking scheme that can detect and localise tampered and 
recovered images. The purpose is to verify the integrity and authenticity of medical 
images. We presented our watermarking procedures that include data embedding, 
tamper detection and recovery procedure. The experimental results demonstrate that the 
precision of tamper detection and localisation is close to 100% after level-2 detection. 
The tamper recovery rate is better than 86% for a less than half a tampered image. 
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Tampering rate Spread Tampered blocks Recovered Image 
 
 
 
10% 
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30% 
 
 
 
 
40% 
 
 
 
 
50% 
 
 
Figure 5.41. Spread Tamper and recovered images 
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Tampering rate Single tampered block Recovered Image 
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Figure 5.42. Block tamper and recovered images 
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Figure.5.43.  The number of un-recovered blocks for single tampered blocks 
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Figure 5.44. Percentage of un-recovered blocks for column and row- wise tampered 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Research Evaluation and Discussion 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the evaluation of each of the proposed techniques and gives the 
final evaluation of the thesis. This chapter is structured as follows: 
 
• Section 6.2 highlights the criteria to be used for evaluating the thesis 
• Section 6.3 discusses experimental results from strict authentication 
watermarking (SAW) and evaluates the technique 
• Section 6.4 discusses experimental results from the strict authentication 
watermarking with JPEG (SAW-JPEG) and evaluates the technique 
• Section 6.5 discusses experimental results from authentication watermarking 
with tamper detection and recovery (AW-TDR) and evaluates the technique 
• Section 6.6 presents the overall evaluation of the thesis 
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6.2 Evaluation Criteria 
 
We evaluate our watermarking system according to the requirements outlined by Tong 
Liu, Zheng-ding Qiu (2002) and Lin, Chang (2000): 
 
• Invisibility: The embedded watermark is invisible. It is the basic requirement of 
keeping the quality of marked images. The marked image must be perceptually 
identical to the original one under normal observation. It is a question of making 
sure that the visual impact of watermarking is as weak as possible so that the 
watermarked image remains identical to the originals. 
• Detect tampering: An authentication watermarking system should detect any 
tampering in a marked image. This is the most fundamental property to reliably 
test the authenticity of the image. The system must be sensitive to malicious 
manipulations such as altering the image in specific areas. 
• Security: The embedded watermark cannot be forged or manipulated. In such 
systems, the marking key is private and should be difficult to deduce from the 
detection of information. Insertion of a mark by unauthorised parties should be 
difficult. 
• Identification of manipulated area or localization: The authentication watermark 
should be able to detect the location of altered areas, and verify other areas as 
authentic. The detector should also be able to estimate what kind of modification 
had occurred. 
• Reconstruction of altered regions: The system may need the ability to restore, 
even partially, altered or destroyed regions in order to allow the user to know 
what the original content was of the manipulated areas. 
 
6.3 Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) 
 
• Invisibility and image quality 
Invisibility is achieved as the maximum difference to the original image is only by one 
grey level. Figure 6.1 indicates how much visual difference for each grey level. 
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Figure 6.1. Grey levels 
 
With only 256 bits embedded, distortion is very low with PSNR at 2.6 x 106 dB. 
However, the objective of any medical image would lie in a specific region of interest. 
Although as non-medics we do not know where the exact area of interest is for an 
ultrasound image, it is apparent that the region of interest only lies where the object 
projected by the ultra sound lies. We have made sure that the areas concerned are not 
included for embedding purpose. If the way the ultrasound image is taken and stored is 
changed then the technique will not be relevant anymore. 
 
• Security 
The security for this technique depends on the security of the key used. Bigger key 
space will increase security, but will result in difficulty to manage them. As Tong and 
Zheng-ding (2002) stressed, any algorithm alone cannot guarantee the security of the 
system. It is necessary to define a set of scenarios and specifications describing the 
operation and rules of the system, such as management of the keys or the 
communication protocols between consultants, doctors, technicians and so forth. 
 
• Tamper detection 
The technique will detect tamper by comparing the signature produced by hashing the 
region of interest. Any changes inside the area will have a significant change in the 
signature produced by the hash function. The system however will not detect changes 
made outside the region of interest. If this is of concern, then the system can be made to 
Chapter 6. Research Evaluation and Discussion  124 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
produce a signature of the whole image, which is embedded in the region of non-
interest. At the receiver’s side the watermark, which is the signature, is extracted, and 
reverts the values to the original state. The signature is then calculated and compared to 
the received. 
 
• Reversibility 
The reversibility is achieved by exploiting the characteristic of ultrasound images. With 
plenty of redundant areas outside the region of interest with pixel values of zeros, this 
helps to achieve reversibility without having to employ a sophisticated technique unique 
from the literature. 
 
• Capacity 
The SAW embedding scheme achieves a high capacity for watermarks to be embedded. 
Table 4.3 shows that 510,000 bits could be embedded in an 800x600x8 image with 
distortion less than 32 dB. This gives an embedding rate of 1.06 bits/pixel. This makes 
the scheme superior to that of Guo and Zhuang (2003) where their embedding rate is 
0.0054 bits/pixel. In applications where the watermark is embedded in a RONI, 
potentially an even higher embedding rate could be achieved. 
 
The time to calculate the digital signature for a large image could be a disadvantage to 
this method. It is very compute intensive. For example Cao et al. (2003) noted that the 
time required for the sending and receiving sites for processing a digital mammogram 
could range from 40s for the segmented image of 7 Mb to 3 min for original 36 Mb 
image using Sun Sparc 690MP multiprocessor machine. 
 
• Recovery 
This method, although capable of detecting single bit changes within an entire image, 
has no capability to determine where the tamper has occurred or restore the tampered 
image to its original. 
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6.4 Strict Authentication Watermarking with JPEG Compression 
(SAW-JPEG) 
 
• Invisibility and image quality 
In this technique, the same amount of information as in SAW, is embedded into the 
image, however the number of embedded bits is significantly higher, in this case 64 
times. Invisibility is maintained as only one grey level is involved. Using only the least 
significant bit, which is the eighth bit, the distortion level is kept very low with PSNR at 
6.1 x 104 dB. 
 
• Security, tamper detection and reversibility 
The security of this technique also depends on the key. The technique is reversible and 
has excellent tamper detection, but no capability for reconstruction. This is the same 
with SAW. 
 
• Robust to JPEG 
The technique is robust to compression and was tailored to JPEG. It survives 
compression up to a specific level for a watermark embedded in the LSB. This approach 
appears unique than that reported in the literature. 
 
• Informed authentication 
The SAW technique uses informed authentication, that is it calculates the digital 
signature using information from the original image. In order to authenticate, the 
received digital signature should be compared against a new digital signature calculated 
for the original image. In telemedicine applications, the original image may not be 
available and so the digital signature must be found for the received image and 
compared to the received digital signature. The scheme is shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 Final scheme for SAW-JPEG 
 
6.5 Authentication Watermarking with Tamper Detection and 
Recovery (AW-TDR) 
 
• Invisibility and image quality 
Invisibility is achieved in this technique, by restricting modification to only the LSB. 
The embedding rate is 1 bit per pixel. The quality of the watermarked image is good 
with PSNR at 54 dB. Unlike the previous techniques the authentication and recovery 
bits are embedded in the ROI as well as RONI. 
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This scheme will be unacceptable in applications where there must be no modification 
to the image, and in such cases the watermarks could be embedded into a RONI if such 
a suitable region exists. It is clear that the image is modified, but the effect is minimal 
and such a change should be imperceptible to clinicians and would not affect diagnostic 
accuracy. There are currently no standards or guidelines for acceptable changes to 
watermarked images. Acceptable limits could be determined through clinical validation. 
This would require comparison of a sufficiently large number of images by separate 
clinicians to determine whether perceptible differences exist between images with and 
without watermarks and if such differences affect clinical decisions. 
 
The design of such a study is described in Appendix A, but it was beyond the scope of 
this work to carry the study out. 
 
• Security 
The strength of this technique depends on the key and the use of k < Nb may not 
provide sufficient security. For an 800 x 600 image, there are approximately 1600 keys. 
This can easily be defeated with brute force attack. Using k > Nb will result in loss of 
key uniqueness, where more than one key can produce equivalent watermarks for the 
same image. 
 
• Tamper detection and tamper localization 
Tamper detection depends on the probability of getting the parity bit, p and average 
intensity, v. The probability of miss for level 1 detection is ½ x ½ = ¼ = 0.25. So the 
probability of missing detection for 6x6 block at level 2 detection would be ( ¼ )4 = 
1/256 = 0.0039. For level-1 detection, if the type of error is parity error, then we are 
sure that the sub-block is indeed tampered. For level-2 detection, if the type of error is 
an intensity relationship error, we cannot be sure whether the sub-block under 
inspection is tampered with or other sub blocks within the same block are tampered. 
However, some pixels within the block must be in error. Thus, in case the tampered 
sub-block is not detected in level 1 inspection, the whole block will be marked tampered 
after level 2 inspections. 
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From the experimental results in Table 5.2 we find that the maximum missing rate after 
level-1 detection is 16% (probability of 0.16) and after level 2 detection is 0.1%. From 
the results, we can conclude that our method can detect tamper of size 3 x 3 pixels with 
a probability of 0.84 and tamper of size 6 x 6 pixels with a probability of 0.99. Using a 
mean intensity parity bit , it also ensures that we do not have a false alarm. 
 
• Reconstruction 
Reconstruction is achieved by embedding the recovery bits in a block some distance 
away from the original block as suggested by Fridrich and Goljan (1999). From the 
experimental results, it showed that the recovery bits were not embedded in blocks 
situated in the same column, but with some percentage in the same row. Those in the 
same row must have an odd distance from the original, because the way we spread the 
tamper was by using the same size, as the block use for embedding and the distance 
from each other were at least one block. If we change the tamper block size in the 
spread-tampered blocks, then we may have a different result. 
 
42 21 22 23 24 25 26 43 
41 20 7 8 9 10 27 44 
40 19 6 1 2 11 28 45 
39 18 5 4 3 12 29 46 
38 17 16 15 14 13 30 47 
37 36 35 34 33 32 31 48 
  (a) 
31 28 3 26 1 24 47 6 
8 5 42 17 40 15 22 29 
33 30 19 48 23 38 45 4 
10 7 44 21 46 13 20 27 
35 32 9 34 11 36 43 2 
12 37 14 39 16 41 18 25 
(b) 
 
Figure 6.3 (a) Spiral numbering of blocks (b) mapping with k=23, shaded blocks will not be 
recovered for 4x4 blocks tamper 
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We could also change the way we order the block number. Will it make a difference in 
the distribution of blocks? For example we could start the block at the centre and move 
in a spiral manner. 
 
We anticipate the tamper is likely to be in the middle as the feature of ultrasound images 
has the region of interest in the middle. Our preliminary results show that the block 
spiralling and starting in the middle will have a greater chance of recovery compared to 
our proposed method. If we tamper with the 2x2 block in the middle, we will have two 
blocks that cannot be recovered, giving us 2/4 =50% recovery rate (refer to Figure 
5.12(b)). With the spiral method we will have a 100% recovery for 2x2 block tamper in 
the middle of the image as in figure 6.3(b). If we have 4x4 blocks tampered, the 
proposed method will only have a 5/16 = 31% recovery rate, while the spiral method 
will give a higher recovery rate of 12/16 = 75%. 
 
                    
   (a)          (b) 
                         
                           (c)                         (d) 
Figure 6.4 (a-b) Typical scans, (c-d) Key generated Peano scan 
 
Considering the scan technique may further strengthen the method. In place of the 
simple raster scan, other methods such as those shown in Figure 6.4 could be used. 
Figure 6.4(a) is a reverse raster scan and appears to offer few advantages. Figure 6.4(b) 
is a spiral scan. Although advantageous for blocks in the middle, it retains the 
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weaknesses of raster scan at the edges. The scan method of Figure 6.4(c) is the so-called 
Peano scan with the Peano-Hilbert variant shown in Figure 6.4(d). These are localised 
scan methods and could ensure blocks are relocated a minimum distance away. 
However, work on scanning has been conducted before and applied in other fields of 
research. The type of ordering or scanning called the Peano-Hilbert plane-filling curve 
as shown in figure 6.4(d) has been applied in a compression technique by Lempel and 
Ziv (1986). The possibilities of using the Peano-Hilbert scan for our watermarking 
technique can be explored further to find the optimal recovery point. 
 
• VQ counterfeiting attack  
The scheme is considered to be robust against a VQ counterfeiting attack by adding 
another level of authentication. Although the attack will successfully defeat level-1 and 
level-2 inspection, the attack will not survive level-3 detection (Section 5.5.3) as long as 
the key is kept secret. 
6.6 Final proposal for AW-TDR 
 
This section presents the final proposal for AW-TDR, describing the preparation of 
blocks, the embedding algorithm and the location plan for authentication bits and 
recovery bits. 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the preparation of blocks B for embedding authentication bits and 
blocks C for embedding recovery bits. Blocks B will be mapped on to blocks C using an 
invertible function, as described in chapter 4 and chapter 5. Blocks B and C can be of 
different sizes. 
 
MappingOriginalImage
Divide into Blocks,
BFind ROI
Find RONI Divide into BlocksC
Watermarked
Image
 
Figure 6.5 Mapping blocks in RONI for intensity embedding 
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Figure 6.6 shows the final proposal for the embedding algorithm for AW-TDR. The 
difference to the earlier version is that only the ROI is considered for the authentication 
process. The rest of the image will be used to embed the recovery bits. 
 
Figure 6.7 shows the authentication bits, v and p will be embedded in the ROI and the 
recovery or reconstruction bits will be embedded in the RONI. We suggest the block 
size in ROI to be 4 x 4 pixels, with a sub-block of 2 x 2 pixels and the block size in 
RONI where the recovery bits to be embedded to be 2 x 1 pixels. 
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Figure 6.6 Final AW-TDR embedding 
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Figure 6.7 Location of bits for embedding 
 
Figure 6.8 shows the location of the authentication bits, v and p in the LSB of pixels p1 
and p2 respectively. The recovery bits, r = r1r2r3r4r5r6r7, form a seven-bit value that 
is the average of the sub-block, Bs. The seven bits r1, r2, r3 and r4 are then embedded 
in the four LSBs of pixel c1 and r5, r6 and r7 are embedded in the four LSBs in pixel 
c2. For example if p1= 153, p2= 155, p3= 200 and p4= 180, r = 172 = 101011002 .  If c1 
and c2 is 0 initially, c1 will be 1010 and c2 will be 1100 after embedding. 
r1 r2 r3 r4
r5 r6 r7
p1 p2
p3 p4
p1
p2
p3
p4
p
v
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Avg_Bs = (p1+p2+p3+p4)/4
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Figure 6.8 Location of bits in the corresponding pixels 
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The final proposal will enhance AW-TDR in three aspects: 
 
1. Image quality in the ROI will be improved as the maximum change is 
only 2 bits in every 4 pixels, or embedding rate of 0.5 bits/pixel 
2. Recovery rate will also be better since the recovery bits are located 
outside the region of interest. The disadvantage is that, only 
manipulation done in the ROI will be detected 
3. The quality of the reconstructed image will be enhanced since the 
average of 2 x 2 pixels (please refer to figure 5.10) would be used to 
reconstruct the tampered image. 
6.6 Summary 
 
This chapter reviewed and evaluated the proposed schemes SAW, SAW-JPEG and 
AW-TDR. 
 
SAW, a reversible watermarking scheme being capable of verifying authenticity and 
integrity of ultrasound images is proposed. It also allows recovery of the original image 
at the receiver. The SAW embedding scheme has a high capacity for embedding a 
watermark, in ultrasound images at around 1.06 bits/pixel. This makes the scheme 
superior to that of Guo and Zhuang (2003), which had an embedding rate of 0.0054 
bits/pixel. Since the watermark is embedded in RONI, potentially an even higher 
embedding rate could be achieved. 
 
SAW-JPEG is also a strict-authentication watermarking scheme and is robust to certain 
levels of JPEG compression. This work appears unique and there are no reports of 
embedding a watermark in the LSB to be robust against JPEG compression.  This is 
because it is almost impossible for any image to survive their least significant bits after 
the quantization process. This technique is only unique to images with some areas of 
constant pixel values such as in ultrasound images. The method is based on exploiting 
the image feature that is able to survive compression and so may be modified to be 
robust over other compression schemes. 
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 Requirements SAW SAW-JPEG AW-TDR 
 Invisibility Yes Yes Yes 
MANDATORY Detect tamper Yes Yes Yes 
 Security Key Key Key 
 Reversibility Yes Yes No 
DESIRABLE Compression No Yes No 
 Localise tamper No No Yes 
 Reconstruction No No Yes 
OTHER Distortion 2.6 x 106 dB 6.1 x 104 dB 54 dB 
 
Table 6. 1. Summary of proposed watermarking 
 
AW-TDR is a watermarking scheme that can detect and localise tamper and recover the 
image. The experimental results demonstrate that the precision of tamper detection and 
localisation is close to 100% after level-2 detection. The tamper recovery rate is better 
than 86% for a less than half tampered image. 
 
The three schemes have been implemented on ultrasound images and the results have 
shown to be successful authentications of ultrasound images with the respective 
capabilities shown in Table 6.1.  The mandatory requirements for watermarking 
identified in Table 2.2 were met and additional functionalities were developed. 
 
From the evaluation and comparison of the three schemes proposed, this chapter 
determines current weaknesses and proposes modifications for enhanced versions. This 
includes modifying SAW-JPEG for blind authentication and a scheme for AW-TDR to 
have minimal embedding in the ROI. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Reflections 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
• Section 7.2 summarises the research 
• Section 7.3 highlights the contributions and limitations of this thesis 
• Section 7.4 gives suggestions for continuing the research in future work 
• Section 7.5 summarises this chapter 
• Section 7.6 reflects on the PhD process 
 
7.2 Summary of Research 
 
While the purpose of fragile watermarking and digital signature systems are similar, 
watermarking systems offer several advantages compared to signature systems (Memon 
et al. 1999) at the expense of requiring some modification (watermark insertion) of the 
image data. As a watermark is embedded directly into the image data, no additional 
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information is necessary for authenticity verification. This is unlike digital signatures, 
since the signature itself must be bound to the transmitted data. The critical information 
needed in the authenticity testing process is discreetly hidden and more difficult to 
remove than a digital signature, or even if it is removed, it remains possible to detect 
that it has been tampered with. Also, digital signature systems view an image as an 
arbitrary bit stream and do not exploit its unique structure. Therefore a signature system 
may be able to detect that an image had been modified but cannot characterise the 
alterations. Many watermarking systems can determine which areas of a marked image 
have been altered and which areas have not, as well as estimate the nature of the 
alterations. 
 
7.2.1 Summary 
 
The advantages of watermarking compared to digital signature may be summarised as: 
• No additional information/overhead needed 
• Able to localise tamper or alterations 
• Able to restore tampered images 
 
The topic of watermarking in medical images has received relatively little research and 
analysis of the literature identifies that works remains to be undertaken on: 
• Methods that can be used to solve the problem of watermarking medical images 
• Methods that can be used to detect tampering  
• Methods that can be used to recover tampered images 
 
It is proposed that watermarking is reversible or conducted in the region of non-interest 
to make sure it will not change the diagnosis. This research is concerned with the issue 
of authenticating medical images. The issue of tamper detection and recovery are also of 
interest in this research. 
 
7.2.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
A major concern of the users of medical digital images is that it would be easy to 
modify the contents. Current cryptography methods can detect tampering by generating 
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an authentication for the image, but at the expense of an overhead for its storage. It may 
also be separated from the image. 
 
The aim of this research was to develop a method where the authentication may be 
embedded within the image itself - digital watermarking. The work considered 
watermarking methods that might be robust against the effect of applying lossy 
compression (e.g. JPEG) to such images. The methods were then enhanced to provide 
information on the location of the tampering and have an ability to return an 
approximate rendering of original image. 
 
7.2.3 Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate and develop watermarking techniques 
suitable for medical imaging. This includes: 
 
• The development of watermarking algorithms for: 
o Strict authentication 
o Strict authentication with JPEG compression 
o Tamper detection and recovery 
• An implementation of the techniques on selected medical image modality. 
 
7.3 Contributions and Limitations 
 
The contributions of this thesis will be highlighted from each proposed scheme; Strict 
Authentication Watermarking (SAW), Strict Authentication Watermarking with JPEG 
Compression (SAW-JPEG) and Authentication Watermarking with Tamper Detection 
and Recovery (AW-TDR). 
 
• Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) 
The contributions of this scheme (SAW) cover three different elements of the research 
process: theory, practice and outcome. The integration of the digital signature as the 
watermark, the use of region of non-interest together with random mapping as the 
watermarking region is a novel approach in authentication watermarking. The scheme 
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detects tamper by comparing the signature produced by hashing the region of interest. 
Any changes inside the area will have a significant change in the signature produced by 
the hash function. The system however will not detect changes made outside the region 
of interest. If this is of concern, then the system can be made to produce a signature of 
the whole image, which is embedded in the region of non-interest. At the receiver’s side 
the watermark, which is the signature, is extracted and reverts the values to the original 
state. The signature is then calculated and compared to the received version. 
 
Reversible watermarking for ultrasound images provides a lossless authentication 
watermark, which ensures the integrity of the image data without permanent loss of 
image fidelity. The reversibility is achieved by exploiting the characteristic of the 
ultrasound image. The abundance of redundant areas outside the region of interest with 
pixel values of zeros helps to achieve reversibility without having to employ a 
sophisticated technique and again is unique from studies reported in the literature 
 
The SAW embedding scheme achieves a high capacity for watermarks to be embedded. 
Table 4.3 shows that 510,000 bits could be embedded in an 800x600x8 image with 
distortion less than 32 dB. This gives an embedding rate of 1.06 bits/pixel. This makes 
the scheme superior to that of Guo and Zhuang (2003) where their embedding rate is 
0.0054 bits/pixel. In applications where the watermark is embedded in a RONI, 
potentially an even higher embedding rate could be achieved. 
 
 
• Strict Authentication Watermarking with JPEG Compression. 
The contribution that emerges from SAW-JPEG is an embedding technique in the LSB 
that can survive JPEG quantization process. The use of knowledge of the quantization 
algorithm to allow the DC coefficient to be unchanged through the 
compression/decompression process is used for the proposed watermarking scheme. 
There has been no attempt in studies from the literature to embed watermark in the LSB 
to be robust against JPEG compression before, as it is almost impossible for any image 
to survive their least significant bits after quantization process. 
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The SAW-JPEG technique uses informed authentication, that is it calculates the digital 
signature using information from the original image. In order to authenticate, the 
received digital signature should be compared against a new digital signature calculated 
from the original image. In telemedicine applications, the original image may not be 
available and so the digital signature must be found for the received image and 
compared to the received digital signature. The new scheme is shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
• Authentication Watermarking with Tamper Detection and Recovery (AW-TDR) 
AW-TDR is an efficient and effective digital watermarking method for image tamper 
detection and recovery. The contribution of this method is the integration of four 
concepts derived from the literature; 1) block-based (Fridrich and Goljan 1999); 2) 
separating authentication bits and recovery bits (Lin and Chang 2001); 3) hierarchical 
(Celik et al 2002); and 4) average intensity as image feature (Lou and Liu 2000). The 
method is efficient as it only uses simple operations, such as a parity check and 
comparison between average intensities. It is effective because the scheme inspects the 
image hierarchically with the inspection view increasing along with the hierarchy so 
that the accuracy of tamper localisation can be ensured. This scheme can perform both 
tamper detection and recovery for tampered images. Tamper detection is achieved 
through a block-based, inspection and recovery of a tampered block.  It relies on its 
feature information hidden in another block that can be determined by a one-
dimensional transformation. 
 
The scheme is considered to be robust against a VQ counterfeiting attack by adding 
another level of authentication. Although the attack will successfully defeat level-1 and 
level-2 inspection, the attack will not survive level-3 detection (Section 5.5.3) as long as 
the key is kept secret. 
 
A modification for AW-TDR to have minimal embedding in the ROI was proposed. 
The final proposal will enhance AW-TDR in three aspects: 
 
1. Image quality in the ROI will be improved as the maximum change is only 2 bits 
in every 4 pixels, or embedding rate of 0.5 bits/pixel 
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2. Recovery rate will also be improved since the recovery bits are located outside 
the region of interest. The disadvantage is that only manipulation done in the 
ROI will be detected 
3. The quality of the reconstructed image will be enhanced since the average of 2 x 
2 pixels (please refer to figure 5.10) would be used to reconstruct the tampered 
image. 
 
Limitations: 
• SAW and SAW-JPEG are only applicable to images with RONI (e.g., 
ultrasound images). 
• SAW and SAW-JPEG do not allow any bit change in the ROI. This implies that 
any legitimate image processing that changes the spatial value of the image will 
result in the image being considered as tampered. 
• Security of AW-TDR depending on keys only. The use of k < Nb may not 
provide sufficient security. For an 800 x 600 image, there are approximately 
1600 keys, which can easily be defeated with a severe attack. 
• The three proposed schemes only consider LSB as the watermarking domain and 
so remain as fragile schemes 
• AW-TDR is designed to detect local manipulations such as cut and paste, 
repainting and erasing. Global manipulations such as compression will result in 
the whole image is considered tampered. 
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Table 7.1 shows the summary of the contributions from the thesis. 
 
Research Process Contribution 
 
 
 
Theory 
1.   The integration of a digital signature as a watermark and  
      region of non-interest and random mapping as   embedding     
      area. 
2. The use of an image feature for reversible watermarking. 
3. The use of knowledge of the quantization algorithm to 
allow the DC coefficient to be unchanged through the 
compression/decompression process for watermarking. 
4. The integration of four concepts introduced from the 
literature; block-based; separating authentication bits and 
recovery bits; hierarchical detection; and average intensity 
as image feature for detection and recovery. 
 
 
Practice   
1.   Development of a scheme that is able to authenticate     
      medical images with reversible capability. 
2.   Development of a scheme that is able to authenticate   
      medical images and can survive a certain level of JPEG   
      compression. 
3.   Development of a hierarchical scheme that is able to    
      localise tamper with recovery capability. 
 
Outcome 
1. Strict Authentication Watermarking (SAW) 
2. Strict Authentication Watermarking with JPEG 
Compression (SAW-JPEG)  
3. Authentication Watermarking with Tamper Detection and 
Recovery (AW-TDR) 
Table 7.1 Thesis Contributions 
7.4 Further Research 
 
The research has opened up a number of possibilities for future work. The suggested list 
is provided below: 
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• Improvement on security for AW-TDR. The use of k < Nb may not provide 
sufficient security. For an 800 x 600 image, there are approximately 1600 keys, 
which can easily be defeated with a severe attack. 
• A variety of different error correction codes can be applied to improve on the 
quality of recovery bits (e.g., Hamming codes, turbo codes, and trellis codes). 
This metadata can be represented as a watermark. For example, a Reed Solomon 
ECC code can be used to generate parity bytes for each row and column of an 
image (Lee and Won 1999, Lee and Chen 2002). These parity bytes can be 
embedded as a watermark in the two significant bit planes of the image. 
• To include reversible watermarking techniques, for example the one proposed 
by Goljan et al (2001) and at the same time maintain tamper detection and 
recovery for authentication bits embedded in the ROI. 
• The possibilities of using the Peano-Hilbert scan for the AW-TDR watermarking 
technique can be explored further to find the optimal recovery point. 
• As compression is acceptable in a medical standard such as DICOM, 
investigation on embedding in other domains such as DCT (used in JPEG) and 
wavelet (used in JPEG2000) should be considered to make sure the watermark is 
robust against those compression schemes. 
• As in a radiology image lossy compression (Wong et al 1995), there exists no 
legal standards for regulating how much distortion induced by watermarking 
system can be accepted. To be acceptable, a watermarking system requires 
thorough clinical validation tests. Such tests must be carried out on a large 
number of images and should involve a number of clinicians to assure the 
diagnostic accuracy is not jeopardised by such distortion. We propose a study in 
Appendix A to find out whether or not our watermarking scheme interferes with 
clinical diagnosis. 
• Application on other image modalities such as computed tomography (CT), 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), positron emission tomography (PET), 
single photon emission computerised tomography (SPECT), nuclear medicine 
(NM), digital subtraction angiography  (DSA), and digitalflurography (DF). 
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• Issues in practical application in a real-world hospital environment need to be 
investigated before watermarking could possibly be used. 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This research has demonstrated that watermarking can provide authentication for 
medical images. Three fragile watermarking schemes SAW, SAW-JPEG and AW-TDR 
have been investigated. 
 
This research has extended current technology in fragile watermarking by providing a 
high capacity, reversible authentication service for medical images.  SAW-JPEG 
demonstrates a technique to embed information in the LSB that can survive JPEG 
quantization process. 
 
A hierarchical image authentication watermark (AW-TDR) is proposed that is able to 
validate the source of the image, verify its integrity, and when the integrity verification 
fails, determine the altered image regions. This approach overcomes the security 
problems associated with previous independent block-based authentication watermarks, 
while retaining their tamper localisation properties. The algorithm has been shown to 
provide security against vector-quantization (collage) counterfeiting attacks and 
accurate localisation of altered image regions. 
 
Three schemes have been implemented on ultrasound images and the results have 
shown successful authentication of ultrasound images with the respective capabilities 
shown in table 6.1. The mandatory requirements for watermarking, identified in Table 
2.2, were met with some additional functionality. 
 
From the results and evaluation, it can be concluded that this research has met the 
objectives outlined in chapter 1. 
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7.5.1 Watermarking Future 
 
Watermarking is still not a fully mature and understood technology, and many questions 
remain unanswered. However, the interest in watermarking is high, both from the 
academia and industry. The interest from academia is reflected in the number of 
publications on watermarking and in the number of conferences being held on 
watermarking and data hiding. The interest from industry is evident from the number of 
companies that have funded research in the field. 
 
There exist enough applications where watermarking can provide working and 
successful solutions. Specifically for audio and video, it seems that watermarking 
technology will become widely deployed (MusicTrace 2005). The DVD industry 
standard, for example, will use watermarking for copy protection system (DRM Watch 
Staff 2004). Similarly, plans exist to use watermarking for copy protection for Internet 
audio distribution. Broadcast monitoring using watermarking is another application that 
will probably be widely deployed for both audio and video (Digimark 2001). Whether 
the development of watermarking technology will become a success story or not, 
remains to be seen, but it is a research area that is fast developing. 
 
7.6 Personal Remarks 
 
7.6.1 My PhD Journey 
 
I am a lecturer at a university in Malaysia. I started my PhD when I was 35 years old, 
married with 5 children. It was not a straightforward decision to do a PhD. Although the 
university encourages people to do their PhD as early as possible in order to increase 
and enrich research activities in the country. A decision to leave your home for a period 
of over 3 years has to be based on a strategic plan as it will not only involve me, as the 
PhD candidate, but my family members too. So the initial plan was I would pursue my 
PhD, my husband will pursue his sub-specialty and three of the children would follow 
us. 
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I arrived in London in January, when the temperature was below 10 degree Celsius. It 
was soaring 33 degree at home! My first worry was the thought that I will not survive in 
this weather, not the PhD. We went through the immigration office who asked some 
absurd questions such as ‘How much money do you have?’ and ‘Are you going back to 
your country after you have completed your studies?’ The impression we got was that 
we are not welcome here. My first big hurdle was to find suitable accommodation for a 
family with three children. Many landlords turned us down because we have children. 
Once we lost our deposit money to an agent when the landlord did not allow us to move 
in at the last minute. We felt as if the system in this country was all against us. I felt like 
taking a drastic decision to quit the idea of doing a PhD. We eventually found 
accommodation after 3 tearful weeks with the help of a colleague from the department. 
We have to make do with a small space. 
 
Being in a different country having a different culture is difficult, but it also enriches 
our learning process. Those experiences make us stronger as a person. I learnt that I had 
to take responsibility for my own learning. I was not used to deciding for myself. I felt 
lost, like being left in a forest and asked to find my own way. I would ask ‘But where 
should I go?’ and ‘what path should I choose?’ Nobody can answer those questions for 
me. 
 
The process of completing the PhD took me through a series of emotions, not just the 
mental vigour to grasp what other people were doing in your field and to find out 
methodologies and approaches in trying to answer your questions. I will not forget 
incidences such as the Iraq war since March 2003, the Tsunami in December 2004 and 
recently the London bombings of 7th July 2005. I am writing them here because they 
have affected me in many ways and these events keep coming back to my mind when I 
sat writing this thesis. 
 
So what will happen to me after the PhD? I will return to the university that sponsored 
me, Kolej Universiti Kejuruteraan Teknologi Malaysia (KUKTEM). Hopefully I will be 
able to pursue the research area of digital watermarking in medical images. I have 
already established contacts with radiologists from the Medical Faculty of the 
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International Islamic University Malaysia to become collaborators for the clinical 
evaluation of watermarked images. The hospital will be implementing teleradiology, so 
there will be medical images transferred across the network. The appropriate ethical 
approval will be sought from the university’s ethic committee when I return to 
Malaysia. 
 
7.6.2 My Conclusion on Security of Medical Images 
 
A few people have asked me, “Why do you need to watermark medical images?” and a 
few others have asked me, “Who would want to forge medical images?”. Here I will try 
to answer these two questions. 
 
There is public concern regarding medical images being viewed and used by 
inappropriate parties, including relatives. This is of particular concern in telemedicine 
applications (Tachakra et al 1996) where images are shared outside a single 
organisation. Watermarking offers a method to embed patient details within an image, 
but in a way invisible to unauthorised persons. This may go some way to address these 
issues. 
 
The approach taken in developing security techniques usually sees everybody as a 
potential criminal. This is really pathetic as the reasons behind it can be fictitious. This 
is to me like waiting in the battlefield waiting for an enemy that may never exist. To 
answer the second question, I could make a few fictitious criminals - the manipulation 
that can be achieved by adding or removing some parts of the image. The first person 
could be someone who wants to make false insurance claim by forging a medical image. 
The second person sells a forged medical image of a famous person to a tabloid 
newspaper. The third person is really vicious; he/she is trying to get away from his/her 
crime (homicide) by not just forging medical images, but the whole medical data to 
show that the death is through natural causes. But who gives them access to the data? 
An unauthorised person having access to the data, meaning that all security measures 
have failed. These include access to the building, to the room where the computer is 
located, the hospital network and the server where the data is stored. Planning to break 
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all of these security measures require a lot of resources. Maybe it is cheaper and easier 
to bribe a person who has access to the file than to break the code. I shall leave this to 
the scriptwriter to keep the suspense. 
 
A technology solution to provide privacy, confidentiality and security of medical data is 
important. However, technology can do very little to ensure that the person receiving 
information will handle it according to standards. That depends on ethics and an 
effective supervision and legal structure that provides sanctions against detected misuse. 
As the demand for sophisticated IT in healthcare grew over US$25 billion in 2000 
(Anderson 2000), technology must also be made comprehensible to the clinicians and 
medical personnel; otherwise they will resist it. 
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Glossary 
 
 
 
 
 
Active attack Any attempt to thwart the purpose of a watermarking system by 
modifying content. This includes unauthorised removal and 
unauthorized embedding. 
 
Adversary Anyone who attempts to thwart the purpose of a watermarking 
system. Depending on the application, adversaries might attempt 
a variety of attacks, including unauthorised removal, 
unauthorised detection and unauthorised embedding. Other terms 
from the literature that have been used for an adversary include 
pirate, hacker, attacker and traitor. 
 
Asymmetric key watermarking Any method of watermarking in which embedding 
and detection require the use of different watermarking keys. 
 
Authentication The process of verifying the integrity of a watermark or the 
watermarked image. 
 
Blind Authentication Authentication without any knowledge of the original, 
unwatermarked content. 
 
Cryptography The study and practice of keeping message secure. 
 
Digital signature The digital equivalent of a traditional signature. They are used to 
verify the identity of the sender. A digital signature can be 
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constructed by encrypting a one-way hash of a message with the 
sender’s private key. 
 
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) A transform commonly used in image and video 
compression. The basic functions in this transform are real-
valued cosine waves. 
 
Error correction code (ECC) A mapping of messages into sequences of symbols 
such that not every possible sequence represents a message. In 
decoding such a code, sequences that do not correspond to 
messages are interpreted as corrupted code words. By defining 
the mapping between messages and code words in an appropriate 
way, it is possible to build decoders that can identify the code 
word closest to a given, corrupted sequence. 
 
Exact authentication  Verification that every bit of a given image has remained 
unchanged. This is in contrast to selective authentication. 
 
False negative A type of error in which a detector fails to detect a watermark in a 
watermarked image. 
 
False positive A type of error in which a detector incorrectly determines that a 
watermark is present in an image that was never watermarked. 
 
Fragile watermark A watermark that becomes undetectable after even minor 
modifications of the image in which it is embedded. These are 
unsatisfactory for most applications, but can be useful for 
authentication. 
Hash function A mapping of a variable length string into a fixed-length string 
called a hash. Typically, the hash of a string is shorter than the 
original. 
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Imperceptible Undetectable by a human perceptual system. This is often defined 
statistically. 
 
Information hiding The art and science of hiding information. The fields of 
steganography and watermarking are examples of information 
hiding, but the term covers many other subjects, such as 
anonymous communications and preventing unauthorized 
database inference. 
 
JPEG Joint Picture Experts Group- JPEG is a standard image 
compression technique based on block DCT quantization. 
JPEG2000 is a multi-scale wavelet-based image compression 
standard. 
 
Key management Procedures for ensuring the integrity of keys used in 
cryptographic systems. This can include key generation, key 
distribution and key verification. 
 
LSB watermarking The practice of embedding watermarks by placing information in 
the least significant bits of the image. 
 
Message authentication Code (MAC)   A one-way hash of a message that is then 
appended to the message. This is used to verify that the message 
is not altered between the time the hash is appended and the time 
it is tested. 
 
One-way hash A hash function reasonably inexpensive to calculate, but 
prohibitively expensive to invert. That is, given an input string, it 
is easy to find the corresponding output. However, given a 
desired output, it is virtually impossible to find a corresponding 
input string. 
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Reversible watermark A watermark that can be exactly removed from the 
watermarked image, thereby obtaining a bit-for-bit copy of the 
original unwatermarked image. Such watermarks are more 
commonly referred to as invertible or erasable. 
 
Robustness The ability of watermarks to survive signal processing operations. 
 
Security In watermarking, the ability of a watermark to resist intentional 
tampering. More generally, the ability of an entire system (which 
may incorporate watermarking) to resist intentional tampering. 
 
Semi-fragile watermark A watermark that is fragile against certain distortions but 
robust against others. This is useful for selective authentication. 
 
Steganography The art of concealed communication by hiding messages in 
seemingly safe objects. The very existence of a steganographic 
message is secret. This term is derived from the Greek words 
steganos, which means covered, and graphia, which means 
writing. 
 
Watermark A general term that can refer to an embedded message, a 
reference pattern, a message pattern or an added pattern. 
Watermark key A secret key or key pair used for watermark embedding and 
detection. A watermark key can be used in conjunction with a 
cipher key. 
 
Watermarking The practice of imperceptibly altering an image to embed a 
message about that image. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Clinical Assessment of Ultrasound 
Images 
 
Clinical assessment 
 
Digital watermarking introduces identifiers to guard against false ownership claims and 
fabrication. Through visual inspection by the naked eye, these images appear to be 
unaltered and therefore medical diagnoses should not be any different regardless of the 
presence or absence of the identifiers. Technically speaking, the image pixels are 
preserved despite the introduction of the identifiers and therefore the assumption that 
the clinical diagnoses remain unchanged is technically sound.  However, clinical 
assessment of these images would in some way add further evidence to the conclusions 
reached so far, but more importantly, such a study would reduce anxieties and fears that 
may arise among clinicians as the result of this technique. 
 
Methodology and Statistical Analysis 
 
This study involves subjecting assessors to two sets of images, the original (group O) 
and those digitally watermarked (group DW). Both groups view ultrasound images that 
essentially are similar, except the latter has been digitally watermarked with this new 
technique. Group 0 would be regarded as a control against for group DW to be 
compared against. This study is conducted in a blind manner in that the assessors do not 
know which of the images to be assessed has been watermarked.  The assessors will 
consist of four radiologists at consultant level to achieve authority and consistency in 
assessment, who would therefore be familiar with ultrasound images used in clinical 
practise. 
 
Fifteen images are used as controls in group O. The same images are digitally 
watermarked to represent group DW. All images (O and DW) would be randomly 
Appendix A – Clinical Assessment of Ultrasound Images 165 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
assigned to the assessors who are blind to the group the image belongs to. Each image 
will carry a clinical stem to prompt clinical diagnosis. In cases where a clinical 
diagnosis is not possible, reasons for this are sought, but which could be owing to poor 
image quality. The assessors are also given the opportunity to add comments on all 
aspects of the image being assessed should they need to do so. 
 
All images assessed would be re grouped into groups O and DW and a Chi Square test 
is employed to detect any significant difference between them. A value P<0.05 is taken 
as the level of significance. Further analysis would also be carried out on images (if 
incorrectly diagnosed) to explain this finding. 
 
The study would also look into comments made by assessors in all aspects of the 
images, as these comments would also form the basis of any conclusion formed from 
this clinical assessment. 
 
List of images for evaluation: 
1. Abdominal aortic aneurysm 
2. Adrenal mass 
3. Liver cysts 
4. Liver metastases 
5. Cholecystitis / cholelithiasis 
6. Achilles tendon tear 
7. Forearm abscess 
8. Muscle mass 
9. Patellar tendon tear 
10. Rotator cuff tear 
11. Breast cyst 
12. Abnormal endometrium 
13. Adnexal mass 
14. Ovarian cyst 
15. Greater saphenous vein thrombosis. 
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CLINICAL ASSESMENT OF ULTRASOUND IMAGES 
 
Investigator: Jasni M Zain 
Brunel University 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. 
 
The aim is to find out whether or not embedded ultrasound images alter clinical 
diagnosis when compared to the original ones. 
 
In this study, ultrasound images underwent a process called watermarking, mainly to 
add security during image transfer. By visual inspection, the images do not change as 
the result of the process; this study will go one step further by subjecting these images 
to objective clinical assessment. 
 
You will be given 10 ultrasound images, a mixture of the original and the embedded, 
each with a brief clinical summary to help you arrive at the most likely diagnosis. You 
will not be able to differentiate whether or not these images have been embedded. 
 
Your task is to enter the most likely diagnosis based on the clinical summary and the 
ultrasound image provided. Please do not write a descriptive report. If you cannot arrive 
at a single diagnosis, please choose a box to state the reason. 
 
Thank you for your kind help. 
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Clinical summaries and the ultrasound images 
1. Abdominal ultrasound of a 72-year-old man with chronic abdominal 
discomfort. 
 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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2. A screening abdominal ultrasound of a woman with confirmed lung 
malignancy showing the left adrenal. 
 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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3. A young woman with one-day history of right upper quadrant pain that 
resolved on arrival to the casualty department. The liver functions tests and 
total white cell count were all normal. This is an ultrasound image of the 
liver. 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
 
Appendix A – Clinical Assessment of Ultrasound Images 170 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
4. A liver ultrasound of a man with adenocarcinoma of her left lung.  
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A – Clinical Assessment of Ultrasound Images 171 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
5. An obese female patient with 2 days history of fever and constant right 
upper quadrant pain.  
 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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6. A left heel ultrasound of an amateur rugby player who could not walk 
following a tackle.  
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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7. A poorly controlled diabetic man with a swollen and tender forearm. 
Blood tests showed elevated white cells with neutrophils predominance. 
This is the ultrasound of his forearm. 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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8. A middle-aged man with recent history of thigh swelling. This image 
was from the swollen area. 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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9. A knee ultrasound of a man with a tender kneecap following a football 
game. 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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10. A shoulder ultrasound done on a javelin thrower with severe shoulder 
pain following a big javelin throw. 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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11. A breast ultrasound of an asymptomatic woman. 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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12. A lady with frequent heavy periods underwent a pelvic ultrasound. 
 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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13. An adnexal image from a pelvic ultrasound of an elderly lady with 
malignant ascites. 
 
 
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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14. A young woman with an intermittent left iliac fossa pain. This image is 
from her left ovary.  
 
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A – Clinical Assessment of Ultrasound Images 181 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
15. A right inner thigh ultrasound of an obese woman with chronic varicose 
veins and previous history of right deep venous thrombosis. She presented 
with an acutely swollen right leg. 
  
 
 
The most likely diagnosis is  
 
 
Please choose the appropriate box if no diagnosis is entered 
Don’t know  
 
Inadequate clinical information  
 
Poor image quality  
 
Two or more diagnoses are equally 
likely 
 
Others  
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Appendix B – Program Listing 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Function:  Calculates the PSNR (Peak Signal to Noise Ratio) 
%             of images A and A', both of size MxN 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function A = psnr(image,image_prime,M,N) 
 
    % convert to doubles 
    image=double([image]); 
    image_prime=double([image_prime]); 
 
    % avoid divide by zero nastiness 
    if (sum(sum(image-image_prime)) == 0)     
        error('Input vectors must not be identical') 
    else 
        psnr_num=M*N*max(max(image.^2));                % calculate numerator 
        psnr_den=sum(sum(image-image_prime).^2);      % calculate denominator    
        A=psnr_num/psnr_den;                                % calculate PSNR 
    end 
 
return 
 
 
 
  function [PSNR,mse]=psnr(X,Y) 
% function [PSNR,mse]=psnr(X,Y) 
% Peak signal to noise ratio of the difference between images and the  
%mean square error 
%    If the second input Y is missing then the PSNR and MSE of X itself  
% becomes the output (as if Y=0). 
 
if nargin<2, D=X; 
else 
   if any(size(X)~=size(Y)), error('The input size is not equal to each other!'); end 
   D=X-Y; 
end 
 
mse=sum(D(:).*D(:))/prod(size(X)) 
PSNR=10*log10(255^2/mse) 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Name:  Jasni Zain 
% Project:          Strict Authentication Watermarking 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
Hare = dicomread ('JZI944SA.DCM'); 
info= dicominfo ('JZI944SA.DCM'); 
%F15 = imread('nhs.jpg', 'jpeg'); 
%n =4; % Number of bits to replace 1 <= n <= 7 
%Hare= rgb2gray(Hare); 
Hare = double(Hare); 
%a=mat2str(Hare); 
%z= md5(a) 
Hare1 = Hare; 
for i = 241:248 
    for j =9:16 
        for b=2:-1:1 
             
            Hare1(i,j)= bitset(Hare1(i,j),b,1);  
            
        end 
    end 
end 
for i = 241:248 
    for j =17:24 
        for b=2:-1:1 
             
            Hare1(i,j)= bitset(Hare1(i,j),b,1);  
            
        end 
    end 
end 
for i = 241:248 
    for j =25:32 
        for b=2:-1:1 
             
            Hare1(i,j)= bitset(Hare1(i,j),b,0);  
            %k=k+1; 
        end 
    end 
end 
for i = 241:248 
    for j =33:40 
        for b=2:-1:1 
             
            Hare1(i,j)= bitset(Hare1(i,j),b,0);  
            %k=k+1; 
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        end 
    end 
end 
 
a=Hare1(241:248,9:40) 
%Stego = uint8(double(RemoveLSB(Hare, n)) + double(F15) / 2^(8 - n)); 
 
%Extracted = uint8(double(RemoveMSB(Stego, n))*2^(8-n)); 
psnr_num=800*600*max(max(Hare.^2));                % calculate numerator 
        psnr_den=sum(sum(Hare-Hare1).^2);      % calculate denominator    
        psnr=psnr_num/psnr_den    
Hare1=uint8(Hare1);  
dicomwrite(Hare1, 'c:\temp\wm5.dcm'); 
imview(Hare1, []) 
%figure,imshow(Extracted) 
Hare2=dicomread('c:\temp\wm5.dcm'); 
 
Hare2 = double(Hare2); 
Hare3 = Hare2; 
Arr1=[]; 
for i = 241:248 
    for j =9:40 
        for b=2%2:-1:1 
             
            Arr2= [bitget(Hare3(i,j),b)];  
            Hare3(i,j)=bitset(Hare3(i,j),b,0); 
            Arr1=[Arr1 Arr2]; 
        end 
    end 
end 
Arr1 
Hare3=uint8(Hare3);  
%x= mat2str(Hare3); 
%y= md5(x) 
%dicomwrite(Hare3,'c:\temp\result4.dcm'); 
%imview(Hare3, []) 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% 
%   This program implements the Secure Hash Standard SHA-256 as set forth by 
%   the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2. 
% 
%   
% 
%Inputs: 
%           1. Input File - name of the input file. The file must be text 
%              file in ASCII format. 
%           2. Output File - name/location of the output file.   
% 
%Outputs: 
%           1. Output File- The final hash value is 
%              placed in this file as a Hex value on the first line. 
% 
% 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function sha256() 
 
%Ask for user input 
fname=input('Input File (in ASCII format)? ','s'); 
hash_foutname=input('Output File for SHA256 Hash? ','s'); 
 
%Open the input file and get the first line of data 
fid=fopen(fname); 
M = fread(fid); 
fclose(fid); 
 
%Convert the input message from ASCII to 8-bit binary values for each character 
% M=dec2bin((abs(input(1))),8); 
% for i = 2:length(input) 
%     M=strcat(M,dec2bin(abs(input(i)),8)); 
% end     
     
%Get Constants - K256 and initial hash values, H0 
[K256 H]=constants(1); 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%                   PREPROCESSING SECTION 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
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%PAD THE MESSAGE 
 
%Calculate the number of zeros needed to pad the message up to 448 
len=8*length(M); 
k=mod(448-mod(len,512)-1,512); 
 
if (k > 0) 
    M(length(M)+1)=128; 
end 
 
for i=2:(k+1)/8 
    M(length(M)+1)=0; 
end 
 
%Append the bit value of the length of the message to fill up to 512 
len_bin=dec2base(len,2,64); 
for i=1:8 
    M(length(M)+1) = bin2dec(len_bin(1,(8*i-7):(8*i))); 
end 
 
 
%PARSING THE PADDED MESSAGE 
 
%Calculate the number of blocks in the message 
N=length(M)/64; 
 
%Split the message into N 512-bit blocks of message 
%Each N block has 16 32-bit blocks 
cnt = 1; 
for i=1:N 
    for j=1:16 
        
M_parsed(i,j)=bitshift(M(cnt),24)+bitshift(M(cnt+1),16)+bitshift(M(cnt+2),8)+M(cnt+
3); 
        cnt = cnt + 4; 
    end 
end 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%                   PROCESSING SECTION 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
%Process each 512 bit block of Message individually 
for i = 1:N 
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    %PREPARE THE MESSAGE SCHEDULE 
    %The first 16 blocks of message schedules are 32-bit blocks of the N block 
    for t = 1:16 
        W(t)=M_parsed(i,t); 
    end 
     
    %The next 48 message schedules are calculated as follows from the initial 16 
message schedules 
    for t = 17:64 
         
        W(t) = add4num32(gam1(W(t-2)),W(t-7),gam0(W(t-15)),W(t-16)); 
         
    end 
     
    %Intialize the eight working variables to initial hash values 
    a = H(i,1); 
    b = H(i,2); 
    c = H(i,3); 
    d = H(i,4); 
    e = H(i,5); 
    f = H(i,6); 
    g = H(i,7); 
    h = H(i,8); 
 
    %Compute all 64 iterations of the eight working variables 
    for t = 1:64 
         
        T1 = add5num32(h,eps1(e),Ch(e,f,g),K256(t),W(t)); 
        T2 = mod(eps0(a) + Maj(a,b,c),2^32); 
        h = g; 
        g = f; 
        f = e; 
        e = mod((d + T1),2^32); 
        d = c; 
        c = b; 
        b = a; 
        a = mod((T1 + T2),2^32); 
         
    end 
     
    %Compute the i-th hash values for N block 
    H(i+1,1) = mod((a + H(i,1)),2^32); 
    H(i+1,2) = mod((b + H(i,2)),2^32); 
    H(i+1,3) = mod((c + H(i,3)),2^32); 
    H(i+1,4) = mod((d + H(i,4)),2^32); 
    H(i+1,5) = mod((e + H(i,5)),2^32); 
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    H(i+1,6) = mod((f + H(i,6)),2^32); 
    H(i+1,7) = mod((g + H(i,7)),2^32); 
    H(i+1,8) = mod((h + H(i,8)),2^32); 
     
end 
 
%Open the output file and store hex values of each hash as one line 
 
fid=fopen(hash_foutname,'at'); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,1),8)); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,2),8)); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,3),8)); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,4),8)); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,5),8)); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,6),8)); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,7),8)); 
fprintf(fid,'%s',dec2hex(H(N+1,8),8)); 
fclose(fid); 
 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%                   FUNCTIONS SECTION 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
         
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  Function: gam0 
% 
%  Defined SHA256 function 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%        
function [result] = gam0(x) 
 
result1=rotr(x,7); 
result2=rotr(x,18); 
result3=shr(x,3); 
result = bitxor(bitxor(result1,result2),result3); 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
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% 
%  Function: gam1 
% 
%  Defined SHA256 function 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = gam1(x) 
 
result1=rotr(x,17); 
result2=rotr(x,19); 
result3=shr(x,10); 
result = bitxor(bitxor(result1,result2),result3); 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  Function: eps0 
% 
%  Defined SHA256 function 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = eps0(x) 
 
result1=rotr(x,2); 
result2=rotr(x,13); 
result3=rotr(x,22); 
result = bitxor(bitxor(result1,result2),result3); 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  Function: eps1 
% 
%  Defined SHA256 function 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = eps1(x) 
 
result1=rotr(x,6); 
result2=rotr(x,11); 
result3=rotr(x,25); 
result = bitxor(bitxor(result1,result2),result3); 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  Function: shr 
%   
%  Shifts a binary number x positions to 
%  the right, placing '0' values in the  
%  x left positions 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = shr(x,n) 
 
result = bitshift(x,-n,32); 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  Function: rotr 
% 
%  Shifts a binary number x positions to 
%  the right, rotating the shifted values 
%  back into the left. 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = rotr(x,n) 
 
result = bitor(bitshift(x,-n,32),(bitshift(x,32-n,32))); 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  function: add4num32 
% 
%  Adds 4 32-bit numbers 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = add4num32(x1,x2,x3,x4) 
 
result=mod(x1+x2+x3+x4,2^32); 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  function: add5num32 
% 
%  Adds 5 32-bit numbers 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = add5num32(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5) 
 
result=mod(x1+x2+x3+x4+x5,2^32); 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  function: Ch  
% 
%  defined SHA256 function 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = Ch(x,y,z) 
 
temp1 = bitand(x,y); 
temp2 = bitand(bitcmp(x,32),z); 
result = bitxor(temp1,temp2); 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  function: Maj 
% 
%  defined SHA256 function 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [result] = Maj(x,y,z) 
 
temp1 = bitand(x,y); 
temp2 = bitand(x,z); 
temp3 = bitand(z,y); 
result = bitxor(bitxor(temp1,temp2),temp3); 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
% 
%  function: constants 
% 
%  produces SHA256 constants 
% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% 
function [K256,H] = constants(temp); 
 
%SHA-256 Constant Definitions 
%1 
K256(1)=1116352408;K256(2)=1899447441;K256(3)=3049323471;K256(4)=3921009
573; 
K256(5)=961987163;K256(6)=1508970993;K256(7)=2453635748;K256(8)=28707632
21; 
%2 
K256(9)=3624381080;K256(10)=310598401;K256(11)=607225278;K256(12)=142688
1987; 
K256(13)=1925078388;K256(14)=2162078206;K256(15)=2614888103;K256(16)=324
8222580; 
%3 
K256(17)=3835390401;K256(18)=4022224774;K256(19)=264347078;K256(20)=6048
07628; 
K256(21)=770255983;K256(22)=1249150122;K256(23)=1555081692;K256(24)=1996
064986; 
%4 
K256(25)=2554220882;K256(26)=2821834349;K256(27)=2952996808;K256(28)=321
0313671; 
K256(29)=3336571891;K256(30)=3584528711;K256(31)=113926993;K256(32)=3382
41895; 
%5 
K256(33)=666307205;K256(34)=773529912;K256(35)=1294757372;K256(36)=13961
82291; 
K256(37)=1695183700;K256(38)=1986661051;K256(39)=2177026350;K256(40)=245
6956037; 
%6 
K256(41)=2730485921;K256(42)=2820302411;K256(43)=3259730800;K256(44)=334
5764771; 
K256(45)=3516065817;K256(46)=3600352804;K256(47)=4094571909;K256(48)=275
423344; 
%7 
K256(49)=430227734;K256(50)=506948616;K256(51)=659060556;K256(52)=883997
877; 
K256(53)=958139571;K256(54)=1322822218;K256(55)=1537002063;K256(56)=1747
873779; 
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%8 
K256(57)=1955562222;K256(58)=2024104815;K256(59)=2227730452;K256(60)=236
1852424; 
K256(61)=2428436474;K256(62)=2756734187;K256(63)=3204031479;K256(64)=332
9325298; 
 
%Intial Hash Values 
 
H(1,1)=1779033703; 
H(1,2)=3144134277; 
H(1,3)=1013904242; 
H(1,4)=2773480762; 
H(1,5)=1359893119; 
H(1,6)=2600822924; 
H(1,7)=528734635; 
H(1,8)=1541459225; 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Name:  Jasni Zain 
%Project:  Image relocation using toral automorphism 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
clear all; 
 
% save start time 
start_time=cputime; 
 
blocksize=4;                    % set the blocksize 
   
% read in the cover object 
file_name='sig4.bmp'; 
cover_object=(imread(file_name)); 
%cover_object=rgb2gray(cover_object); 
cover_object=double(cover_object); 
% determine size of cover image 
Mc=size(cover_object,1);         %Height 
Nc=size(cover_object,2);         %Width 
%ABB=[]; 
Br=floor(Nc/blocksize);  % Blocks per row 
Bc= floor(Mc/blocksize); % Blocks per column 
 
numblock= Br*Bc; % number of blocks 
k=max(primes(numblock/2)); 
 
 
ABB=[]; 
for A= 1:numblock 
    AB = mod((k*A), numblock)+1; %mapping the blocks 
    ABB=[ABB AB]; 
end 
B=[1:numblock]; 
mapA= [B;ABB]; 
 
mapB=[];mapBB=[]; 
for i= 1:numblock 
    mapB(1,mapA(2,i))=mapA(2,i); %mapping the blocks 
    mapB(2,mapA(2,i))=mapA(1,i); 
    
end 
new_image= cover_object; 
x=1; y=1; 
for i=1:numblock 
     % numbering block 
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    block=cover_object(y:y+blocksize-1,x:x+blocksize-1); 
     
    targetblock= mapA(2,i);     
    rownum=round( ceil(targetblock/Br)); 
    colnum= round(targetblock-(rownum-1)*Br); 
    xs=(rownum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    ys=(colnum-1)*blocksize+1; 
 
     
    if (x+blocksize) > Nc 
     if y+blocksize < Mc 
        x=1; 
        y=y+blocksize; 
    end 
     else 
        x=x+blocksize; 
       
    end 
        new_image(xs:xs+blocksize-1,ys:ys+blocksize-1)=block; 
  end 
   
%sub-block watermark generation 
toral_image=uint8(new_image); 
imwrite(toral_image,'toraltest3.bmp','bmp'); 
 
 
% display processing time 
%elapsed_time=cputime-start_time, 
 
% display psnr of watermarked image 
%psnr=psnr(cover_object,watermarked_image), 
 
% display watermarked image 
figure 
imshow(toral_image) 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Name:  Jasni Zain 
%Project:  Spread Embedding for Tamper detection 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
clear all; 
 
% save start time 
start_time=cputime; 
 
blocksize=8;                    % set the blocksize 
percent= 50;                %set tamper percentage 
   
% read in the cover object 
file_name='ustest.bmp'; 
cover_object=(imread(file_name)); 
%cover_object=rgb2gray(cover_object); 
cover_object=double(cover_object); 
% determine size of cover image 
Mc=size(cover_object,1);         %Height 
Nc=size(cover_object,2);         %Width 
areatam= Mc*Nc*percent;             % area of tamper 
%ABB=[]; 
Br=floor(Nc/blocksize);  % Blocks per row 
Bc= floor(Mc/blocksize); % Blocks per column 
 
numblock= Br*Bc; % number of blocks 
numtamblk= floor(numblock*percent/100); 
 
factam=floor(100/percent);  %factor of tampered block 
k=max(primes(numblock/2)); 
tampered_image=cover_object; 
for i= 1:numtamblk 
    targetblock= i;     
    rownum=round( ceil(targetblock/Br)); 
    colnum= round(targetblock-(rownum-1)*Br); 
    ys=(rownum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    xs=(colnum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    startblock=cover_object(ys:ys+blocksize-1,xs:xs+blocksize-1);%start of target block 
        for ii=1:blocksize 
            for jj= 1:blocksize 
                startblock(ii,jj)=255; 
            end 
        end 
        tampered_image(ys:ys+blocksize-1,xs:xs+blocksize-1)= startblock; 
 end 
 tampered_image=uint8(tampered_image); 
Appendix B: Program Listing  197 
Digital Watermarking for Medical Images  Jasni Zain 
imwrite(tampered_image,'tamper250.bmp','bmp'); 
 
 
% display watermarked image 
figure 
imshow(tampered_image) 
title('Tamper detect') 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Name:  Jasni Zain 
%Project:  Embedding for Tamper detection 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
clear all; 
 
% save start time 
start_time=cputime; 
 
blocksize=8;                    % set the blocksize 
 
         
% read in the cover object 
file_name='ultrasound2.jpg'; 
cover_object=(imread(file_name)); 
cover_object=rgb2gray(cover_object); 
cover_object=double(cover_object); 
% determine size of cover image 
Mc=size(cover_object,1);         %Height 
Nc=size(cover_object,2);         %Width 
 
Br=floor(Nc/blocksize);  % Blocks per row 
Bc= floor(Mc/blocksize); % Blocks per column 
ABB=[]; 
numblock= Br*Bc; % number of blocks 
k=max(primes(numblock/2)); 
 
for A= 1:numblock 
    AB = mod((k*A), numblock)+1; %mapping the blocks 
    ABB=[ABB AB]; 
end 
B=[1:numblock]; 
mapA= [B;ABB]; 
mapB=[]; 
for i= 1:numblock 
    mapB(1,mapA(2,i))=mapA(2,i); %mapping the blocks 
    mapB(2,mapA(2,i))=mapA(1,i); 
    
end 
mapB; 
 
% generate shell of watermarked image 
watermarked_image=cover_object; 
x=1; 
y=1; 
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% process the image in blocks 
  
for i = 1:numblock 
 
    % numbering block 
    block=cover_object(y:y+blocksize-1,x:x+blocksize-1); 
    cover= RemoveLSB(block,1); % reset the LSB to 0 
    AvgB=round(sum(sum(cover))/(blocksize*blocksize)); % average of block 
    targetblock= mapB(2,i);     
    rownum=round( ceil(targetblock/Br)); 
    colnum= round(targetblock-(rownum-1)*Br); 
    ys=(rownum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    xs=(colnum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    startblock=cover_object(ys:ys+blocksize-1,xs:xs+blocksize-1);%start of target block 
    cover1=RemoveLSB(startblock,1); 
     
    % prepare sub-block 
    x1=1; 
    y1=1; 
    for sub= 1:4 
    subblok= cover(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1); 
    AvgBs=round(sum(sum(subblok))/(blocksize/2)*(blocksize/2)); 
    if AvgBs >= AvgB 
        v=1; 
    else v=0; 
    end 
    %parity 
    par=0; 
    embedbit=[]; 
     
     for b=8:-1:2 
        bit=bitget(AvgBs,b); 
            if bit==1 
            par=par+1; 
            end 
        end 
     
    if rem (par,2)==0 %even 
        p= 1; 
    else p=0; 
    end 
    substart=cover1(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1); 
    AvgBc=round((sum(sum(substart)))/((blocksize/2)*(blocksize/2))); 
        for b=8:-1:2 
        bit=bitget(AvgBc,b); 
        embedbit=[embedbit bit]; 
        end 
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    embedbit=[v p embedbit]; %the watermark (v,p,r) 
    %embed in 2x2 subblock 
    n=1; 
    for ii=y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-2 
        for jj=x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-2 
            block(ii,jj)=bitset(block(ii,jj),1,embedbit(n)); 
            n=n+1; 
        end 
    end 
 
   % block(x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1, y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1)=subblok; 
 
    if (x1+(blocksize/2))> blocksize 
        if y1 +(blocksize/2) < blocksize 
            x1=1; 
            y1= y1+(blocksize/2); 
        end 
        else 
            x1=x1+(blocksize/2); 
             
    end 
end 
  watermarked_image(y:y+blocksize-1, x:x+blocksize-1)=block; 
 
  if (x+blocksize) > Nc 
     if y+blocksize < Mc 
        x=1; 
        y=y+blocksize; 
    end 
     else 
        x=x+blocksize; 
       
    end 
  end 
   
difference= cover_object- watermarked_image; 
imshow(difference,[-1 1]) 
%sub-block watermark generation 
watermarked_image_int=uint8(watermarked_image); 
imwrite(watermarked_image_int,'ustest.bmp','bmp'); 
 
 
% display processing time 
%elapsed_time=cputime-start_time, 
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% display psnr of watermarked image 
psnr=psnr(cover_object,watermarked_image), 
 
% display watermarked image 
 
imview(watermarked_image_int) 
title('Watermarked Image') 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Name:  Jasni Zain 
%Project:  Level-2 detection 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
clear all; 
 
% save start time 
start_time=cputime; 
 
blocksize=8;                    % set the blocksize 
 
         
% read in the cover object 
file_name='tamper250.bmp'; 
cover_object=(imread(file_name)); 
 
%cover_object=rgb2gray(cover_object); 
cover_object=double(cover_object); 
% determine size of cover image 
Mc=size(cover_object,1);         %Height 
Nc=size(cover_object,2);         %Width 
Br=floor(Nc/blocksize);  % Blocks per row 
Bc= floor(Mc/blocksize); % Blocks per column 
 
ABB=[]; 
numblock= Br*Bc; % number of blocks 
k=max(primes(numblock/2)); 
for A= 1:numblock 
    AB = mod((k*A), numblock)+1; %mapping the blocks 
    ABB=[ABB AB]; 
end 
B=[1:numblock]; 
mapA= [B;ABB]; 
 
 
mapB=[]; 
for i= 1:numblock 
    mapB(1,mapA(2,i))=mapA(2,i); %mapping the blocks 
    mapB(2,mapA(2,i))=mapA(1,i); 
    
end 
mapB; 
 
% determine maximum message size based on cover object, and blocksize 
max_message=Mc*Nc/(blocksize^2); 
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% generate shell of watermarked image 
recover_image=cover_object; 
x=1; 
y=1; 
 
% process the image in blocks 
%for block=1:(round(Mc/blocksize)* round(Nc/blocksize)) 
 
%sumblock=sum(sum( cover_object(x:x+blocksize-1,y:y+blocksize-1))); 
%wm= round(sumblock/(blocksize*blocksize)); 
tamperblock=0; 
for i = 1:numblock 
 
    % numbering block 
    block=cover_object(y:y+blocksize-1,x:x+blocksize-1); 
    cover= RemoveLSB(block,1); % reset the LSB to 0 
    AvgB=round(sum(sum(cover))/(blocksize*blocksize)); % average of block 
     
    targetblock= mapA(2,i);     
    rownum=round( ceil(targetblock/Br)); 
    colnum= round(targetblock-(rownum-1)*Br); 
    ys=(rownum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    xs=(colnum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    startblock=cover_object(ys:ys+blocksize-1,xs:xs+blocksize-1); 
    cover1=RemoveLSB(startblock,1); 
   % AvgBc=round(sum(sum(cover1))/(blocksize*blocksize)); 
     
    % prepare sub-block 
    x1=1; 
    y1=1; 
    for sub= 1:4 
        subblok= block(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1); 
        bitv= bitget(subblok(1,1),1);   % getting v from sub block 
        bitp= bitget(subblok(1,2),1);   % getting p from sub block 
        subblok=RemoveLSB(subblok,1); 
        AvgBs=round(sum(sum(subblok))/(blocksize/2)*(blocksize/2)); 
        if      AvgBs >= AvgB 
                v1=1; 
        else    v1=0; 
        end 
        %parity 
        par=0; 
        embedbit=[]; 
   
        for b=8:-1:2 
            bit=bitget(AvgBs,b); 
            embedbit=[embedbit bit]; 
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            if  bit==1 
                par=par+1; 
            end 
        end 
     
        if   rem (par,2)==0 %even 
             p1= 1; 
        else p1=0; 
        end 
     
        if and(p1==bitp, v1==bitv) 
            for ii= 1:(blocksize/2) 
                for jj=1:(blocksize/2) 
                    subblok(ii,jj)=subblok(ii,jj); 
               
                end 
            end 
             
            block(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1)=subblok; 
            if (x1+(blocksize/2))> blocksize 
                if y1 +(blocksize/2) < blocksize 
                x1=1; 
                y1= y1+(blocksize/2); 
                end 
            else 
            x1=x1+(blocksize/2); 
             
            end 
        else 
        %find recovery block 
         
        x1=1;y1=1; 
         for l=1:4  
                      
            substart=startblock(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1); 
            n=1; 
            targetbit=0; 
            for ii=y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-2 
                for jj=x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-2 
                     
                    bit=bitget(startblock(ii,jj),1); 
                    targetbit=bitset(targetbit,8-(n-3), bit); 
                    
                   n=n+1; 
                end 
            end 
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         targetbit=bitset(targetbit,10, 0); 
         targetbit=bitset(targetbit,9, 0); 
          
            for ii= 1:(blocksize/2) 
                for jj=1:(blocksize/2) 
                    subblok(ii,jj)=targetbit; 
                end 
            end 
            block(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1)=subblok; 
             tamperblock=tamperblock+1; 
            if (x1+(blocksize/2))> blocksize 
                if y1 +(blocksize/2) < blocksize 
                x1=1; 
                y1= y1+(blocksize/2); 
                end 
            else 
            x1=x1+(blocksize/2); 
             
            end 
        end 
           
        end 
  
        
        
    end    
    recover_image(y:y+blocksize-1, x:x+blocksize-1)=block; 
 
        if (x+blocksize) > Nc 
            if y+blocksize < Mc 
                x=1; 
                y=y+blocksize; 
            end 
        else 
        x=x+blocksize; 
       
        end 
  end 
 
 
%sub-block watermark generation 
recover_image_int=uint8(recover_image); 
imwrite(recover_image_int,'recovered250.bmp','bmp'); 
 
tamperblock 
% display processing time 
%elapsed_time=cputime-start_time, 
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% display psnr of watermarked image 
%psnr=psnr(cover_object,watermarked_image), 
 
% display watermarked image 
figure 
imshow(recover_image,[0 255]) 
title('Tamper detect') 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%Name:  Jasni Zain 
%Project:  Image recovery 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
clear all; 
 
% save start time 
start_time=cputime; 
 
blocksize=8;                    % set the blocksize 
 
         
% read in the cover object 
file_name='ustamp.bmp'; 
filename2='sig4.bmp'; 
sig_file=(imread(filename2)); 
sig_file=double(sig_file); 
cover_object=(imread(file_name)); 
 
%cover_object=rgb2gray(cover_object); 
cover_object=double(cover_object); 
% determine size of cover image 
Mc=size(cover_object,1);         %Height 
Nc=size(cover_object,2);         %Width 
Br=floor(Nc/blocksize);  % Blocks per row 
Bc= floor(Mc/blocksize); % Blocks per column 
 
ABB=[]; 
numblock= Br*Bc; % number of blocks 
k=max(primes(numblock/2)); 
for A= 1:numblock 
    AB = mod((k*A), numblock)+1; %mapping the blocks 
    ABB=[ABB AB]; 
end 
B=[1:numblock]; 
mapA= [B;ABB]; 
 
 
mapB=[]; 
for i= 1:numblock 
    mapB(1,mapA(2,i))=mapA(2,i); %mapping the blocks 
    mapB(2,mapA(2,i))=mapA(1,i); 
    
end 
mapB; 
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% determine maximum message size based on cover object, and blocksize 
max_message=Mc*Nc/(blocksize^2); 
 
% generate shell of watermarked image 
recover_image=cover_object; 
x=1; 
y=1; 
 
% process the image in blocks 
%for block=1:(round(Mc/blocksize)* round(Nc/blocksize)) 
 
%sumblock=sum(sum( cover_object(x:x+blocksize-1,y:y+blocksize-1))); 
%wm= round(sumblock/(blocksize*blocksize)); 
tamperblock=0; 
for i = 1:numblock 
 
    % numbering block 
    block=cover_object(y:y+blocksize-1,x:x+blocksize-1); 
    
    cover= RemoveLSB(block,1); % reset the LSB to 0 
    AvgB=round(sum(sum(cover))/(blocksize*blocksize)); % average of block 
     
    targetblock= mapA(2,i);     
    rownum=round( ceil(targetblock/Br)); 
    colnum= round(targetblock-(rownum-1)*Br); 
    ys=(rownum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    xs=(colnum-1)*blocksize+1; 
    startblock=cover_object(ys:ys+blocksize-1,xs:xs+blocksize-1); 
    cover1=RemoveLSB(startblock,1); 
    AvgBc=round(sum(sum(cover1))/(blocksize*blocksize)); 
     
    % prepare sub-block 
    x1=1; 
    y1=1; 
    for sub= 1:4 
        subblok= block(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1); 
        bitv= bitget(subblok(1,1),1);   % getting v from sub block 
        bitp= bitget(subblok(1,2),1);   % getting p from sub block 
        subblok=RemoveLSB(subblok,1); 
        AvgBs=round(sum(sum(subblok))/(blocksize/2)*(blocksize/2)); 
        if      AvgBs >= AvgB 
                v1=1; 
        else    v1=0; 
        end 
        %parity 
        par=0; 
        embedbit=[]; 
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        for b=8:-1:2 
            bit=bitget(AvgBs,b); 
            embedbit=[embedbit bit]; 
            if  bit==1 
                par=par+1; 
            end 
        end 
     
        if   rem (par,2)==0 %even 
             p1= 1; 
        else p1=0; 
        end 
     
        if and(p1==bitp, v1==bitv) 
            for ii= 1:(blocksize/2) 
                for jj=1:(blocksize/2) 
                    subblok(ii,jj)=subblok(ii,jj); 
               
                end 
            end 
        else 
        %find recovery block 
           block=sig_file(y:y+blocksize-1,x:x+blocksize-1); 
       end 
  
          %block(y1:y1+(blocksize/2)-1, x1:x1+(blocksize/2)-1)=subblok; 
    
        if (x1+(blocksize/2))> blocksize 
            if y1 +(blocksize/2) < blocksize 
                x1=1; 
                y1= y1+(blocksize/2); 
            end 
        else 
            x1=x1+(blocksize/2); 
             
        end 
    end    
    recover_image(y:y+blocksize-1, x:x+blocksize-1)=block; 
 
        if (x+blocksize) > Nc 
            if y+blocksize < Mc 
                x=1; 
                y=y+blocksize; 
            end 
        else 
        x=x+blocksize; 
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        end 
  end 
 
 
%sub-block watermark generation 
recover_image_int=uint8(recover_image); 
imwrite(recover_image_int,'us3.bmp','bmp'); 
 
tamperblock 
% display processing time 
%elapsed_time=cputime-start_time, 
 
% display psnr of watermarked image 
%psnr=psnr(cover_object,watermarked_image), 
 
% display watermarked image 
figure 
imshow(recover_image,[0 255]) 
title('Tamper detect') 
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Spread 10% 
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Spread 20% 
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Spread 30% 
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Spread 40% 
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Spread 50% 
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Block 10% 
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Block 20% 
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Block 30% 
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Block 40% 
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